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MORAL HAZARD AND THE INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERING
Christine Hurt*

INTRODUCTION

The United States securities market is at a crossroads. Almost
every aspect of buying and trading listed securities has come under
intense

scrutiny recently,'

from the method

that publicly held

corporations use to calculate earnings and report those earnings in
disclosure statements 2 to timing strategies that allow some investors in
mutual funds to accrue hidden profits created by stale prices. 3 Even the

inner workings of the New York Stock Exchange have come under
fire.4 Rising skepticism among the public has created a backlash
against corporations, underwriters, analysts, and mutual funds that has
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D., University of Texas
School of Law; B.A., Texas Tech University. The author would like to thank her Marquette
colleagues, who gave critical advice during a presentation of this article at a March 2004 faculty
workshop, and her excellent research assistant, Trevor Haley. In addition, other individuals gave
helpful feedback on various drafts of the article: Joseph D. Kearney, Russell Korobkin, Jill E.
Fisch, D. Gordon Smith, and Eric Goldman.
I But see A Penny in Whose Pocket, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 71 (describing Wall
Street as "everybody's favourite scapegoat" at the end of the "dotcom party") [hereinafter
Pocket].
2 See Deborah Solomon et al., Milestone for "Timing" Scandal,WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003,
at C l (reporting on the first securities fraud charge against a mutual fund, Putnam Investments, in
connection with the mutual fund market timing scandal and drawing a time line of the scandal,
beginning with New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's charges against Canary Capital on
September 3, 2003).
3 See generally David Million, Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly
Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890 (2002) (describing
recent scandals related to aggressive "earnings management"); see also John Cook, The Year of
Corporate Crooks, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23, 2003, at D1 (remarking that before
the mutual fund timing scandals, the mutual fund industry was "highly regarded" by the public).
4 See Susanne Craig & Laurie P. Cohen, SEC Takes Another Look at Grasso, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2003, at C Il(detailing the public outcry over Dick Grasso's $187.5 million deferred
compensation package, which led to the New York Stock Exchange CEO's resignation and new
allegations that Grasso pressured a specialist firm to increase its purchases of shares in American
International Group Inc. (AIG)); Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, NYSE Traders Will Pay Fines of
$240 Million, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2004, at Cl (reporting on settlement among the SEC and the
five largest specialist firms of the NYSE regarding charges that firms profited by buying for their
own accounts when a buyer was readily available, signaling a possible end to the 211-year-old
practice of "open outcry").
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resulted in numerous investigations, civil and criminal, into various
trading practices, some of which have been around in various forms for
years.
At the same time, the number of individual investors
5
participating in the capital markets has grown substantially,
highlighting the discrepancies in investing opportunities between Wall
Street regulars and retail investors.
One of the first trading practices to come under regulatory and
shareholder fire was the initial public offering (IPO) process, which has
revealed itself to be undemocratic at best and manipulative at worst.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s (the "1999-2000 Boom"), a
growing number of companies "went public," making the transition
from being privately owned to having shares traded and owned by
public investors. 6 During the 1999-2000 Boom, IPOs generated $657
billion each year, compared with $8 billion per year in the 1980s.
Among those companies going public were an increasing number of
companies without a significant history of positive earnings. 8 However,
the prices of shares of these companies were skyrocketing in value
during the first hours or days of the offering. 9 Although large first-day
returns of IPO shares have been reported for decades, the first-day
However, most
returns during this period were unprecedented.
individual investors were never buyers of original IPO shares.' 0 In the
presence of very high demand for shares in almost any IPO,
underwriters allocated the majority of original IPO shares to regular
customers, mostly institutional investors, 1 and few retail investors are
5 See Laura S. Unger, Technology and Regulation: The Road Ahead, Address before the San
Diego Securities Institute (Jan. 27, 2000), available at 2000 WL 132740, at * 1 (S.E.C.) (noting
that according to a 1999 survey, "almost half of all households own stock" and at least 18 percent
of those investors had bought or sold stock on the Internet) [hereinafter 2000 Address].
6 See Brian J. Lane, Views into the Crystal Ball, Address before the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association (Nov. 13, 1999), available at 1999 WL
1399912 (S.E.C.) (stating the number of IPOs tripled from 1994 to 1998 and that 1999 would also
be a record year for the aggregate value of IPOs); Jay Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO
Activity, Pricing,and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002) (noting that between 1980 and 2001, an
average of one business a day went public); see also Unger, 2000 Address, supra note 5, at * 1
(stating that the amount of capital raised in IPOs in 1999 was $69.2 billion, or roughly the size of
the 1998 U.S. budget surplus).
7 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1796 (adding that the number declined at the end of
the IPO boom to $34 billion in 2001).
8 See id. at 1801 (stating that by 1999-2001, 72 percent of companies going public were
technology companies, few of these companies had even four quarters of positive earnings, much
less four years of positive earnings, which was standard in the 1980s, and 79 percent of these
companies had negative earnings).
9 See discussion infra Part II.A.
10 See discussion infra Part lI.B.
II See, e.g., Beatrice Boehmer et al., Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in IPOs
with Better Long Run Returns? 14 (Mar. 29, 2004), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=350720
(last accessed Oct. 3, 2004) (stating that in their sample, 79 percent of the shares in the IPOs were
allocated by the underwriter); William R. Hambrecht, Fixing the IPO Process, (Aug. 2002), at
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/bill_pov/200209/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004
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able to buy these shares until they were resold by an original buyer.
Because of the high demand for IPO shares, any investor who was
offered the opportunity to buy original IPO shares at the offering price
was buying an almost guaranteed first-day profit.
Unfortunately, the majority of the shares issued in IPOs in the last
few years did not retain that initial profit, and the share price eventually
plummeted, resulting in a loss for the retail investor who purchased in
the aftermarket. 12 For every person inside the IPO loop who sold high,
a retail investor bought high. What at first seems to be a very
respectable process, managed by the most elite investment banks,
analysts, and venture capitalists substantially conforming to existing
securities laws, turns out to be a Wall Street-sponsored "pump-anddump" scheme.
Historically, taking a company public was the equivalent of
receiving the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval; not only was the
company a success story, but Wall Street was vouching for its potential
for all the investing public to see. However, after the end of the most
recent IPO boom, investors are beginning to realize that Wall Street was
very willing to sell its stamp of approval for the opportunity to use a
company's IPO for personal gain. In the 1999-2000 Boom the investing
public fell victim to the oldest trick in the IPO order book: The Pumpand-Dump. Together, existing securities laws and industry customs
have worked together to create a system that not only routinely excludes
the small investor from seizing the opportunity to be an original buyer
of IPO shares but also cleverly attracts the same investor to purchase
these same shares in the aftermarket, locking in a profit for the fortunate
original buyers. 13
The legal academic literature has previously treated the basic IPO
process with undeserved respect. Although academics have focused on
specific aspects of the IPO process that could be improved to eliminate
certain market inefficiencies or on certain relationships or pieces of
information that could be disclosed more fully, this Article fills a
specific vacuum by arguing that the entirety of the IPO process is much
more in need of reform than any of its parts alone. From the date of the
first road show to the date that the last industry player sells original IPO
shares, participants use existing avenues in regulatory schemes to

("The traditional allocation of 1POs has been 80% institutional, 20% retail.").
12 See discussion infra Part II.B.
13 One judge in describing the recent technology bust and related putative plaintiff-investor
claims not only blamed the starry-eyed investor but also condemned the IPO market as "a
freewheeling casino that lured 1,000's obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches, but which
delivered such riches to only a handful of lucky winners." In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Unfortunately, in the
case of the IPO market, the lucky winners are not randomly chosen, but are handpicked by the
industry players.
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extract wealth from retail investors wanting to invest in an initial public
offering. Although certain reforms have been enacted or proposed, they
address only the symptoms of an infirm process and not the inherent
root cause of the infirmity. This Article argues that the root cause of the
abuses in the IPO process is the bookbuilding method of distributing
IPO shares. This discriminatory system of pre-allocating shares to
industry players creates an inefficient market for IPO shares that
negatively affects both issuers and secondary market investors.
Section II of this Article describes the predictable movements of
the share price of a company engaged in an IPO from the first day of the
offering through various time periods and compares these movements to
the expected profile of the share price of a company involved in a
pump-and-dump scheme.
Section III details the various agency
problems, conflicts of interest, and levels of participation in the IPO
process that are characteristic of the various industry players and
investors, and Section IV provides an overview of the common IPO
practices, legal and illegal, that result from those agency problems and
conflicts of interest. Section V argues that the IPO process should be
drastically reformed to improve both the efficiency and the fairness of
the offering system, and Section VI discusses in depth one drastic
alternative to the current system, the IPO auction. Section VII details
recent regulatory reforms that attempt to improve the existing system,
and Section VIII reports on the outcomes of certain SEC investigations
and the status of certain investor-driven lawsuits that call into question
the IPO process. Section IX calls for the abolition of the bookbuilding
method and a recreation of the issuer-underwriter relationship to create
a more transparent IPO process free from inherent and profound agency
problems.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Life Cycle of an IPO

Generally, the IPO share price usually rises above the offering
price during the first day of trading. This increase may be modest or
almost incomprehensibly large. 14 Assuming that the resulting price is
the "market price," many commentators then refer to the IPO offering
14 See Francois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of
Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets, 16 R. FIN. STUDS. 31, 44 (2003) (retelling the story of
Broadcast.com, whose shares began the first day of trading at a premium of 277 percent); Debra
Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?,A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36 (reporting that VA Linux
Systems, Inc. stock was priced at $30 per share, then closed on the first day of trading at more
than $239 per share).
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price as being "underpriced." 15 During the period 1980-2001, the
average IPO share was underpriced by 18.8 percent. 16 However,
underpricing is 17even more pronounced in "hot" IPO markets than in
"cold" markets. Like the stock market as a whole, the market for IPOs
can be described as a cyclical bear and bull market. For example, in the
1999-2000 Boom, one study shows that the average stock was
underpriced by 65 percent, compared to 2001, the beginning of a cold
market, in which underpricing averaged 14 percent. 18 In addition, in the
1999-2000 Boom, the share price doubled in the first day in 182 IPOs
out of a total of 803 offerings. 19 However, one research firm shows that
the average first-day share price increase, or "pop" in 1999 was even
Among IPOs of technology companies,
higher: 77 percent. 20
underpricing was even more dramatic, with one-third of these IPOs
experiencing an increase in share price of 100 percent or more. 2 Not
coincidentally, in bull markets, such as the 1999-2000 Boom, more
companies decide to access the capital markets, and more IPOs take
place. 22 In bear markets, fewer companies make the same decision.
In the first day of an IPO, shares generally flow from institutional
investors, who were allocated original IPO shares from the underwriter,
to retail investors in the aftermarket.2 3 Although some new issues will
see price increases for weeks or even months,2 4 the average IPO share
price will decrease over the first three years. 25 This dynamic results in
15 Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing(Nov. 6,
2003), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=-282293 (last accessed Oct. 3, 2004) (concluding the
discounted offer price is lower than the price available in an exuberant market but still higher than
the "fundamental value" of the shares) [hereinafter Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets]; see also Ritter
& Welch, supra note 6, at 1820 (stating that between 1980-1997, IPO shares had offering prices
50 percent higher than the share prices of comparable publicly-held companies with similar
fundamentals). As used in this Article, "underpriced" reflects the fact that shares are priced less
than the price the market would sustain, but does not suggest that the price is less than the
fundamental value of the company that each share represents.
16 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1795.
17 See Derrien & Womack, supra note 14, at 31 (concluding that in hot markets, underpricing
of IPO shares can be "double-digit" or "triple-digit").
18 Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 10.
19 Id.

20 See Melanie Warner, Friends and Family: Sycamore Gave Lots of "DirectedShares" to a
Key Customer, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 102.
21 See id.
22 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1799 (describing the "window of opportunity" created
by high investment sentiment that lures businesses to conduct an IPO and concluding that
businesses will enter the market at a six-month lag behind high investor sentiment).
23 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 33 (stating 92 percent of shares sold
by institutional investors on the first day of trading are bought by retail investors).
24 See Cameron Stracher, Beyond Billable Hours, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A26
(reporting the share price of Cisco Systems, Inc. rose to 15,191 percent in its first year of public
trading). But see Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 30 (showing companies that
have first-day returns over 60 percent will have the worst one-year returns of all issuers in the
same year).
25 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1817 (concluding that IPO shares have negative three
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the original IPO share recipients realizing the most profits, accompanied
by some investors who were lucky enough to buy quickly and sell
quickly. However, the retail investors who acquired IPO shares from
these investors and who did not sell quickly found themselves to be at
the bottom of the IPO pyramid once the price eventually declined. 26 In
addition, underwriters engage in activities that may penalize retail
investors but not institutional investors from selling early and realizing
a profit, further ensuring that retail investors will not exit as quickly as
the institutional investor. 27 Unfortunately, these activities are widely
known and supported by the agencies charged with regulating these
activities.
B.

The Pump-and-Dump

Securities laws universally condemn "pump-and-dump" schemes
whereby insiders and underwriters hype a company's stock and create
an illusion of high demand, then sell their shares once the public has
accepted the hype and bought the stock.28 Wall Street generally derides
these activities, assigning them to "microcap companies," internet
scams and telemarketing ventures. Disturbingly, the movie "Boiler
Room" juxtaposes a fly-by-night investment banking firm staffed with
loud, aggressive men of varying ethnic backgrounds without ivy league
educations against Wall Street investment banking firms staffed with
sophisticated, WASP-ish MBAs. 29 Of course, the former firm engages
almost exclusively in illegal pump-and-dump schemes. Divorcing these
stereotypes from the actual behavior, imagine a scenario in which any
group of underwriters and company insiders tout the value of a stock, 30

year returns and perform 23.4 percent worse than the average market portfolio over the same time
period); Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why InitialPublic Offerings
Are Underpriced,41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 23 (1993) (showing that for the time period 1968-1987,
IPO shares grew only two percent in the first five years).
26 See John C. Coffee, Jr., IPO Underpricingand Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1999, at
5 (conceptualizing the eventual decline of IPO prices as the result of issuers "borrowing" earnings
from future periods to keep up with the analysts' rosy projections of the IPO share value)
[hereinafter Coffee, Dutch Auctions].
27 Boehmer et al., supra note 11, at 14 (showing that in one sample group, institutional
investors sold twice as much of their allocated shares in the first two days of an offering than did
retail investors).
28 See Pump andDump Schemes, at http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004) (describing pump and dump schemes as "hype and dump manipulation" that
occurs primarily with microcap companies touted on the Internet).
29 BOILER ROOM (New Line Cinema 2000).
30 See Mark Bonham & Craig Norris, Recent Legal and Accounting Issues in Initial Public
Offerings, 10/31/01 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 233, 2001 WL 100035512 (2001)
(describing how some Internet companies "used the initial public offering as a marketing event,
creating legitimacy where the lack of profits and revenues often could not").
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create arrangements whereby other industry insiders create demand in
the stock in return for cheap stock, and then sell their shares shortly
after a successful IPO. This scenario, which describes the U.S. IPO
process, is a pump-and-dump scheme.
Each step in the IPO process, when performed by industry players
acting in their self-interest, creates an ingenious method to extract
wealth from the retail investor. Because industry custom and legal
practices combine together to restrict supply and generate demand, IPO
share prices may increase substantially, allowing both issuer and
industry insiders to sell early and realize profit. However, the average
IPO stock will then see a dramatic decrease, leaving the retail investors
with built-in losses. 31 In keeping with the theory that pump-and-dump
schemes are easier to conduct with smaller issues, dramatic increases in
IPO prices in the first day occur in reverse correlation with the size of
the issue; 32 the efforts to artificially limit supply are more effective if the
supply is thin at the outset. Accordingly, underwriters are able to more
effectively manipulate IPO share prices by pre-allocating most of the
original shares and controlling the resale of those shares, making the
"public float" very small. In addition, this theory of underwriter selfinterest is supported by the fact that in boom periods, more underwriters
bring more issuers to market. In cold periods, underwriters bring fewer
issuers to market. Issuers generally would have the same motivations to
raise capital, diversify holdings of the founders, and provide a liquid
market for its shares regardless of the temperature of the market;
however, underwriters and founders may be more motivated to engage
in an IPO when there is a greater opportunity to extract wealth from the
33
market through the IPO process.
This IPO price curve is the expected result of a concerted effort of
the investment banks and other industry insiders to extract wealth from
the investing public by acquiring stock, hyping that stock, and then
selling that stock. Moreover, some facets of the process are legal; other
practices are arguably illegal, but common, especially in bullish
34
markets. However, the combined practices create an unfair regime.
31 The trick, of course, is to sell while there are more buyers than sellers, before the price
starts to decline. Some economists believe that the discounted IPO share price reflects the risk
that regular customers accept that "sentiment demand" will suddenly cease. Ljungqvist et al., Hot
Markets, supra note 15, at 2.
32 See Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporationand Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
147, 160 (2001) (proffering research on October 1999 IPOs and stating an "inverse correlation"
between the increase in share price in the aftermarket and the offering size).
33 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1802 (noting that when the market cools, IPOs in
preparation generally withdraw from the market altogether, rather than adjust price).
34 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing on preemption grounds plaintiffs' assertions that the entire syndicated underwriting
process, including bookbuilding, road shows, impositions of penalty bids, and tie-in
arrangements, created an anti-competitive market for IPO shares and artificially inflated the price
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Legal academics and economists have extensively examined the many
aspects of the IPO process in the United States and arrived at varying
hypotheses about how each aspect may or may not lead to a more
efficient IPO market or maximize the issuer's goals. 35 However, one
primary regulatory concern in addressing these practices should be
whether the practices working together have an unfair negative impact
on the public investor.
C.

The Scenario

Envision the stereotypical IPO scenario in the 1999-2000 Boom: A
group of entrepreneurs (the "Guys") own and manage Start.com, a webbased company. The Guys have traditional reasons to engage in an
IPO:36 they want to raise capital; they want to diversify their own
portfolios and reduce the risk of tying most of their capital into one
asset; they want to obtain liquidity for their shares and the shares that
they offer to entice employees, vendors, and service providers; and they
want to attain the industry validation that a public offering can bring.
At some point, the Guys begin a relationship with a venture capital
firm (VC) that gives them access to capital for growth and for the
transaction costs necessary to effectuate the IPO. In return, the Guys
give the VC stock and possibly one or more positions on the Board of
Directors of Start.com. With this capital and upon the advice of the VC,
the Guys hire an independent accounting firm, a law firm, and an
investment banking firm (IBank).
The Guys begin discussing with the investment banker
(ModelGuy) the logistics of the offering: timing, size, and price.
During these discussions, ModelGuy alerts the research department of
the investment bank that a new issue is in the pipeline. AnalystGal, the
bank's leading research analyst in the technology industry, starts
meeting with the Guys and learning about Start.com. AnalystGal
usually offers recommendations on new issuers like Start.com and will
in fact be issuing public comments on the value of Start.com's IPO.
for those shares); John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 18, 2001, at 5 (describing as dysfunctional an IPO system that sees up to 75 percent of the
market value of the IPO shares going to either underwriters or institutional investors and not the
issuer) [hereinafter Coffee, Victim].
35 Alexander P. Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 1PO Allocations: Discriminatoryor
Discretionary?, 65 J. FIN. EcON. 167, 168 (2002) ("The bulk of academic theory treats
maximization of proceeds received by the issuer as the appropriate objective.... Some might
even argue for non-discriminatory allocations on egalitarian grounds regardless of the
consequences for issuing firms.") [hereinafter Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Allocations].
36 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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The Guys hope that a positive recommendation from AnalystGal will
cause investors to want to buy stock during the IPO.
But first, the Guys and ModelGuy need to determine a price.
Common sense suggests that everyone would be proposing the highest
price that the market will bear for a given number of shares in the issue.
Start.com will only receive the capital raised in the first sale of each
share, so the higher the offering price, the more capital that Start.corn
will receive. IBank receives a percentage of the capital raised, so the
higher the offering price, the larger the underwriting fee it will receive
and, presumably, the greater ModelGuy's compensation from IBank.
However, neither the Guys nor ModelGuy argue for setting the price at
the highest price the market will bear. Why not?
The Guys of course already own some shares of Start.com.
However, they will also be able to give employees, family members,
and friends the opportunity to buy original IPO shares at the offering
price. The Guys may even get requests for IPO shares from executives
at large, flashy companies that may be future customers, vendors, or
strategic partners. The Guys may calculate that underpricing somewhat
and giving these business colleagues a chance at guaranteed profit will
be good for business. If they can secure a good strategic partnership
before the IPO, that news could even help the stock price in the
secondary market, sealing everyone's potential profit. The Guys also
know a lot of founders who made so much on their IPO shares that they
were even able to retire. Therefore, they consciously or subconsciously
are aware that they need to "buy low."
ModelGuy has competing considerations himself. ModelGuy
knows that in this hot IPO market, investor demand will exceed supply
and the price of the stock will increase dramatically in just the first day
of trading. ModelGuy also will be calling his favorite clients and
offering them the opportunity to buy the shares. These clients may be
repeat brokerage customers, such as institutional investors that
frequently buy shares traded by IBank, or these clients may be current
or potential investment banking clients. ModelGuy knows that an
additional investment banking deal and repeat institutional brokerage
business will bring in more revenue than the marginal difference in the
stock price, so he may be motivated to set the price low in order to
guarantee certain valued customers a profit when those customers resell.
Of course, if all these customers sell the first day or two, then the
price could plummet and some of ModelGuy's customers might not
realize huge gains and may even face a loss. Therefore, the ModelGuy
will tell his customers not to sell the shares for a certain period of time.
He may also encourage them to buy more shares in the secondary
market as a "thank you" for the special allocation. He will restrict the
Guys and the VC from selling any shares for six months or so. If
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anyone gets nervous that market conditions may cause the price to drop
before they can sell, ModelGuy will ask AnalystGal to be sure and issue
favorable reports on Start.com as soon as legally possible and again
simultaneously with the end of this lock-up period. If AnalystGal can
maintain positive recommendations on the stock, then ModelGuy's
customers are virtually assured of realizing a profit from the shares that
they will be allocated if they sell early.
The IPO team determines a price, and the IPO goes forward. The
Guys take the opportunity to allocate some IPO shares to friends,
family, and employees. ModelGuy allocates IPO shares to repeat
institutional investors, regular customers, and executives at companies
that he either has taken public before or would like to take public at a
later date. AnalystGal issues favorable reports about this great new
company. The IPO price skyrockets the first day. Some of the initial
investors sell during the first days and realize huge profits. At the end
of the lock-up period, the Guys, their friends, family members, and
employees, and ModelGuy's executive clients sell.
Because of
AnalystGal's continuing support, the price remains high enough for this
group to also realize huge gains. Everyone wins.

III.

THE PLAYERS

To understand how a process that should benefit the issuer and the
investing public has evolved to benefit primarily agents and
intermediaries, we need to analyze the specific agency problems,
conflicts of interest, and moral hazard inherent in the relationships at
issue in the IPO process. The term "moral hazard" is sometimes used
narrowly to describe the incentive created by a contract, usually an
insurance contract, for one party to do nothing and create losses that the
party will not eventually bear. However, the more general use of the
term, and the one that is employed here, is to describe the incentive
created by any agreement between parties for one party to actively
engage in dubious behavior that will either reward the party or at least
not create loss for the party. 37 Each of the players in the process has the
37 See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 50 (2003)

("After a contract is made, a party to it may have incentives to act in a way that's detrimental to
the other party to the contract."); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 13 (2000) ("In almost ever deal in

which the parties have a continuing relationship there will be the potential for moral hazard. The
moral hazard problem concerns post-contractual opportunism."). In its more general economic
use, the term "moral hazard" is almost interchangeable with the concept of opportunism.
Opportunistic behavior is defined as "when a performing party behaves contrary to the other
party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement's explicit
terms." Timothy J. Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV.
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motivation and opportunity to act in their self-interest to the detriment
of both the issuer and the retail investor. Section IV will describe the
IPO process and the actions of these players in that process that are
motivated by self-interest and opportunism.
A.

The Founders

Although much of the economic and legal literature addresses the
concerns of the issuer in the IPO process, traditional IPO theory has not
separated the founders from the issuer as an entity; however, the
founders and the issuer may have different short-term interests in the
IPO scenario. Under the theory of the firm, the issuer is a separate legal
38
entity from the managers, directors, and the shareholders, and at times
the long-term interest of the firm may deviate from the short-term goals
of the shareholders, directors, and managers. In the beginning of the
corporate life cycle, before outside investors and before any public
offering, the shareholders, directors, and managers may be the same
group of people. These founders operate the company in such a way as
to increase profits to enlarge the pool of excess cash available to pay
salaries, make capital improvements, and generally enhance the quality
of corporate life. Until now, not much concern is paid to the "share
price" because the founders' shares do not have a market for resale.
The founders generally think of the value of their shares as the value of
their proportionate ownership in the enterprise, i.e., the present value of
their share of future profits and the liquidation value of land and
equipment. At this stage, the interests of the issuer as an entity and the
founders may be functionally consistent: to make 39appropriate
investments in capital to increase revenues and lower costs.
Once the founders decide to attract outside investment, whether
through a private or public offering, the interests of the founders, future
shareholders, and the issuer begin to diverge and moral hazard is
created. 40 Founders may want to generate capital for the purpose of
providing the company with funds it needs to grow and prosper, but
founders may also be interested in an "exit strategy." Although most
founders will continue to be shareholders, directors, or managers of the
521, 521 (1981).
38 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 110-

11 (2002) (describing the "reification" of the corporation as a useful, but dangerous construct).
39 See id. at 155 (noting that undiversified managers have interests that are aligned with the
company's long-term goals more than diversified stockholders, at least until the managers
liquidate their undiversified holdings).
40 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 36, at 312-13 (describing how agency problems arise when
owner-managers sell equity shares to outside shareholders, reflecting the conflicts of interest
between the parties).
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issuer, the sheer amount of personal wealth that could be manipulated
from an IPO is very tempting and may take priority over raising the
most capital for the long-term goals of the company. 4 1 Founders begin
to have short-term interests instead of long-term interests.
This opportunism of the founders may be reflected in their
willingness to allow the underwriter to underprice their IPO offerings.
The founders will not sell their shares at the IPO price in the offering
and may be required by the underwriter to hold their shares for six
months or more. However, founders will offer IPO shares at the
offering price to relatives, friends, employees, business colleagues, and
other industry acquaintances. 42 To the extent that founders can deliver
cheap stock to these individuals, the instant wealth created the first day
of the IPO will inure to their benefit. 43 The founders then sell their own
shares after any lock-up period, designated by the underwriter, ends,
generally ninety to 180 days after the IPO.44 Accordingly, in IPO
issues, the amount of manager-owned shares is positively related to the
amount of underpricing. 45 Founders may also be encouraged to
underprice the shares by underwriters who promise them allocations in
future IPOs.46

41 The willingness of the founders to underprice the shares for a quick profit may be relative
to the founder's pre-IPO net worth, with wealthy founders less susceptible to the temptation. See
Shawn Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 84 (describing billionaire Ross
Perot as being "outraged" when institutional investors flipped shares of Perot Systems after its
1999 offering for a $180 million profit). Cf RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 6 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting a Kurt Vonnegut

character who advises a law student to pay attention to transactions in which large amounts of
money will change hands: "If the man who is to receive the treasure is unused to wealth, has an
inferiority complex and shapeless feelings of guilt, as most people do, the lawyer can often take
as much as half the bundle, and still receive the recipient's blubbering thanks.").
42 This Article does not address the efficiency or fairness of practices whereby issuers may
issue stock to these same individuals in a private offering prior to an IPO.
43 See Booth, supra note 32, at 158-59 (describing the seemingly irrational desire of existing
shareholders to have issuers underprice the stock so that they may benefit from the "big pop in
price" rather than to set the share price at market level and allow for both the existing
shareholders and issuer to benefit from the higher price); see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (alleging as proof of motive in § 10(b) claim
against individual officers and directors the gains that the individuals made from underpricing,
which ranged from $220,000 to $40 million in 309 issues).
44 Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and
Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 106 (2002) (explaining why founders are
unconcerned with IPO share price and instead focus on price at the expiration of the lock-up
period) [hereinafter Aggarwal et al., Lockup].
45 Id.

46 John C. Coffee, Jr., "Spinning"forDollars: IPOs and Allocation of Hot Issues, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1998, at 5 (describing a hypothetical scenario in which founders are inclined to protest
because the share price jumped the first day but are placated both by their newly created personal
wealth and by receiving IPO shares of another client of the investment banker) [hereinafter
Coffee, Spinning].
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Venture CapitalFirms

Although the venture capital firm is not technically in an agency
relationship with the issuer during the IPO, 47 the VC has some conflicts
of interest with the issuer and may be in a position to influence the
issuer's decisions in choosing the underwriter and in setting the IPO
offering price. In most circumstances, a venture capital firm will have
provided the issuer with capital that helps the company to become
established and grow and then to get organized and proceed with the
IPO, which can be expensive. 48 As part of the bargain, the VC receives
shares of the company, and the issuer agrees to work toward a
successful IPO that will enable the VC then to sell its shares and "cash
out."' 49 The VC may also negotiate for a position on the Board of the
Directors pre-IPO so that the VC can somewhat control the issuer's
50
short-term strategies.
To the extent that the VC has any contribution to the pricing of the
IPO shares, the VC may want to create the largest short-term premium
so that the VC can also realize gain in the IPO. The VC may also be
motivated to underprice to ensure that the offering is completed and that
the firm's position in the issuer is closed. If the VC's shares will be
restricted by the underwriter after the IPO, the VC will be susceptible to
underwriter persuasion to underprice, to create investor interest and
enthusiasm, and then to exit in a successful secondary offering within
six to nine months. 5 1 Notably, principals in the VC will have had much
input in the selection of the underwriter, 52 who may even reward them
by granting additional IPO shares at the IPO offering price or by
53
allocating original shares in an unrelated IPO.

47 However, if a principal of the VC is a director, the principal will have fiduciary duties to
the issuer.
48 See Robert D. Kraus, Inevitable Conflicts?: When a Venture Capitalist is a Director, 13
Bus. L. TODAY 49, 49 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (describing the process by which a small company
partners with a VC firm for capital in return for preferred stock).
49 The VC's shares may be common stock or preferred shares convertible to common. If an
IPO does not seem feasible, then the issuer may court potential acquirers instead, and the
acquisition then becomes the VC's exit strategy. See Timothy J. Harris, Modeling the Conversion
Decisions of PreferredStock, 58 Bus. LAW. 587 (2003) (noting that acquisition events are much
more common exit events for VCs, especially in "cold" markets such as the post-2000 market).
50 Kraus, supra note 48, at 49-50.
51 See Tully, supra note 41, at 88 (describing the underwriter's "pitch" to VCs "ripe for the
plucking" who might otherwise not agree to the investment banker's underpricing strategy or
refusal to negotiate fees).
52 Some venture capital firms are even divisions of investment banking firms. See Jill E.
Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts,
88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1050 (2003) (remarking that this relationship is problematic, giving
investment banks yet another incentive to support the IPO share price in the secondary market).
53 See Randall Smith et al., Something Ventured, Something Gained?, WALL ST. J. ,Oct. 17,
2002, at CI [hereinafter Smith et al., Something Ventured].
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The Underwriter

Although the founders may have a conflict of interest with the
issuer, a more profound agency problem in the IPO process arises
between the investment bank and the issuer.54 Although the investment
banker's role is to advise the issuer on raising capital with the least cost,
the investment banker may be using the issuer to extract wealth for its
regular customers and future clients.5 5 The underwriter has a conflict of
interest not only when it courts potential clients with IPO shares of a
current client, but also for simply representing both the buyer and the
seller in the same transaction. 56 In most public offerings, a lead
underwriter, an investment banker at an investment banking firm,
manages a syndicate of other broker-dealers who will be responsible for
selling blocks of the IPO shares. The lead underwriter will also be
responsible for distributing some portion of the IPO shares.
Most importantly for our analysis, the underwriter has primary
responsibility for pricing the IPO shares and for distributing them. In
the United States, almost all IPOs are conducted using the bookbuilding
method, which gives the underwriter extraordinary discretion in the
pricing and allocation of the IPO shares. Section IV.A. discusses the
bookbuilding process in more detail.
Some commentators have argued that because underwriters have
ultimate responsibility for sale of the IPO shares in a firm commitment
offering that they intentionally underprice IPO shares for an easy
distribution. 57 Still others have argued that underwriters intentionally
underprice IPO shares to avoid shareholder fraud litigation based on
overpricing or to mitigate damages based on share price declines in
those lawsuits. 58 The third major reason for underpricing, and the one
most often cited by economists, is as consideration to investors who
give the underwriter price information by indicating during the
bookbuilding process at what prices they would be willing to buy the
54 Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Allocations, supra note 35, at 169 (hypothesizing moral
hazard problem in which investment bankers collude with regular customers to extract rents from
the issuing companies).
Although this Article focuses on the conflicts arising in the context of pricing and
allocating IPO shares, recent media attention has also exposed areas in which underwriters may
entice potential investment banking customers with promises to be business clients. See Randall
Smith, Companies Put a New Squeeze on their Investment Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at
Al (describing how Morgan Stanley told Accenture Ltd. during preliminary investment banking
meetings that Morgan Stanley would purchase $20 million in consulting services from the firm).
55 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (describing the IPO process as an "IPO con game").
56 See id. (charging that underwriters award regular customers with "artificially cheap shares"
and get "high-commission stock trades" in return).
57 But see Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1807 (counter-arguing that this theory is weak
because underpricing is more severe in hot IPO markets when shares are easiest to sell).
58 See Alexander, supra note 25, at 24 (discussing three models of lawsuit avoidance theory).
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IPO shares. 59 Although some of those rationales may have some truth
to them, the underpricing of IPO shares is often an intentional act
designed to extract wealth for the few that receive original IPO
60
allocations.
The underwriter begins the offering with an artificially low price,
allowing key beneficiaries access to this bargain. The low price attracts
investors to the initial offering, which stimulates demand for the shares
in the secondary market. The most underpriced offerings take place in
the hottest markets, where retail investors are prone to be overly
optimistic and to buy shares as part of a "bandwagon effect."'6 1 The
high demand creates a high initial return, which stimulates even more
demand. 62 The underwriter is then able to constrict supply further by
using stabilizing techniques, requiring original IPO shareholders to buy
additional shares, and requiring original IPO shareholders to hold on to
those shares for some period of time. 63 Once the price increases to a
satisfactory level, the original IPO investors are able to sell their shares
and recognize large gains.
Critical to the underwriter's incentive to underprice is the fact that
the underwriter has the power to determine which institutions and
individuals will be able to share in this wealth extraction. The
underwriter can use this power to reward current investment banking
clients, reward current brokerage clients, reward venture capital firms
that send underwriting business, and entice future investment banking
clients. 64 Although the underwriter and the investment bank may not
directly profit from selling profit-laden original IPO shares, they benefit
from being able to parcel out that privilege and expect something in
return. 65 If the IPO share prices were not underpriced and therefore did
not have a virtual built-in, guaranteed profit, 66 then the underwriter
59 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1805.
60 See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing overpricing of IPO shares).
61 See Hersh Shefrin, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE

AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 248 (2000) (hypothesizing that investment banks
underprice issues to create demand for the purpose of motivating investors to form a
"bandwagon").
62 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1808 (concluding the greater the initial underpricing,
the greater the trading volume in the aftermarket).
63 See discussion infra Part IV.E (flipping) and Part IV.F (laddering and stabilizing
techniques).
64 Derrien & Womack, supra note 14, at 60 (describing the agency conflict of interest
between the issuer, who may want to mitigate underpricing of shares, and the underwriter who
may choose to reward repeat customers such as brokerage customers, over issuers).
65 See Tully, supra note 41, at 86 (hypothesizing that one reason underpricing and IPO
allocations grew markedly in the 1999-2000 Boom was that underwriters desperately wanted to
offer brokerage clients something that the new, cheap on-line brokerages could not).
66 See David Gardner & Tom Gardner, Two Lessons from Buffett, at http://www.fool.com/
specials/2004/04022000ceo.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). David and Tom Gardner quote
Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com on the "pathological IPO process":
Now anytime you take a company public at an artificially low price, there is
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would forego a lucrative opportunity to maintain and attract valuable

business.

Therefore, an underwriter motivated by opportunism will

67
underprice IPO shares at the expense of the issuer.

Although the founders select the underwriter and presumably could
switch underwriters if they were unhappy with the relationship, some
have suggested that the market for investment banks is not truly
competitive given the small number of investment banks and the

uniform fee structures. 68 In fact, litigation is ongoing by both investorplaintiffs and issuer-plaintiffs alleging antitrust violations against
investment banks in setting underwriting fees. 69 Additionally, as more
issuers both have suffered economic losses from the bursting of the
technology bubble and been named as defendants in securities litigation
brought by IPO investors, some issuers have brought lawsuits against
the underwriters for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties
relating to such practices as underpricing and70allocating the majority of
original IPO shares to underwriter customers.

guaranteed profit. Anytime there is guaranteed profit to be assigned by somebody,
there are kickbacks. It doesn't matter if you are talking about some Paraguay customs
official or if you are talking about some white shoe banker on Wall Street. So what
they were doing is giving guaranteed profits to their friends and pension funds and
other things and getting kickbacks.
Id.
67 See id. (quoting a former investment banker as saying that historically, a "major pop" was a
"black mark" that reflected that the underwriter was not balancing the interest of both issuers and
investors).
68 See Coffee, Dutch Auctions, supra note 26, at 5 (describing underwriters as having a
monopsony in which three underwriters constitute 50 percent of the market for IPOs and in which
all underwriters charge a 7 percent fee for IPOs). A "monopsony" is a monopoly comprised of
buyers, as opposed to sellers. See also Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great
Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FrN. L. 21, 31 (2001) (comparing the non-negotiable 7
percent fee in the U.S. to underwriting fees of 3.4 percent in Japan and 5 percent in Europe).
69 See In re Pub. Offering Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. 98 Civ. 7890, 00 Civ. 7804, 2003 WL
21496795 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2003) (consolidating both issuer and investor actions to deny
motions to dismiss on the basis that SEC regulation and NASD regulation of underwriting fees
did not preclude cause of action for antitrust violations); In re Pub. Offering Fee Antitrust Litig.,
Nos. 01-7585(L), 01-9072, 52 Fed. App. 548 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying motion to dismiss in
investor class action based on reasoning that investors' claimed damages in paying higher IPO
prices was sufficient to plead cause of action); In re Issuer Plaintiff Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust
Litig., No. 00 Civ. 7804, 2004 WL 487222 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004) (denying motions to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds in issuers' class action claim that twenty-eight major investment
banks violated the Sherman Act by colluding to charge uniformly higher fees in IPOs).
70 See, e.g., MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 251
(2002) (denying underwriter's motion to dismiss in class action that alleges, among other things,
that the underwriter breached the underwriting agreement by purposefully underpricing the shares
in order to enrich itself and incur kickbacks from regular customers that received allocations);
Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (granting in part a motion to compel discovery in class action by issuers against Donaldson
Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. for breach of contract in underpricing eighteen IPOs in return
for receiving kickbacks from customers receiving allocations).
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Research Analysts

The "independent" research analyst is generally not considered to
be in an agency relationship with either the issuer or the investing
public. 7 1 Therefore, the moral hazard of the research analyst arises not
from a contract or an agreement between the research analyst and the
issuer or even the public, but in the pressures on the research analyst to
produce biased research reports. Here, the analyst acts as an accessory
to the underwriter in engineering the pump-and-dump scheme, and in
fact, the scheme can only work on a large scale through the efforts of
the analyst.
Although research analysts have traditionally been viewed as
independent gatekeepers to the capital markets and as mere conduits of
information from the issuers to the shareholders, the latest scandals have
exposed analysts as opportunists acting under severe personal and
Although some analysts may be
career conflicts of interest.72
independent of financial or career restrictions, many "sell-side" analysts
are cost-center employees at investment banking firms that rely on
73
brokerage commissions and investment banking business for revenue.
These conflicts of interest also create pressure on the research analyst to
collude with the investment bank to issue overly optimistic reports and
recommendations to maintain artificially high IPO share prices for a
74
sufficient period of time.
In the IPO context, Professors Fisch and Sale have identified three
conflicts of interest that may lead an analyst to zealously hype an IPO
stock and have argued that the analyst be seen as in a quasi-agency
relationship with the investor. 75 In the most obvious conflict situation,
an analyst may personally own stock in the issuer. 76 In addition, the
71 See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that investors did not claim a fiduciary relationship with professional
analysts that issued research reports "free of charge").
72 See generally Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1038 (positing that analysts "have been
relatively free from regulation" due to the SEC's view that analysts were "unbiased market
gatekeepers").
73 See William R. Hambrecht, Comments on the NASD/NYSE IPO Advisory Committee
Report, 7 No. 1 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec. Age 11 (2003) ("Historically, underwriting,
distribution, research and lending were provided by separate firms, helping to create systemic
checks and balances. This is no longer the case.").
74 See Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Marketfor InitialPublic
Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REv. 965, 980 (1995) (concluding that anecdotal evidence suggests that
investment bank analysts issue overly positive reports as a result of pressure from the investment
bank).
75 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1043-56 (concluding that because of these conflicts,
analysts should be seen as salespeople or at best conduits of issuer management to present
selected information to the public).
76 See id; Firm Fined Over "Hot" IPOs; Broker Chargedfor Tainted Reports, 8 No. 17
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 9 (Jan. 15, 2003) (reporting that Paul Johnson, former
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analyst may enjoy a relationship with the issuer's officers that provides
him with information about this company and the industry, 77 or may
work at a firm that either has or wants to have the issuer as an
underwriting customer. 78 Recently, litigation has exposed the fact that
research analysts' compensation and bonuses are related to effects on
increased brokerage activity and obtaining or maintaining investment
79
banking business, not on accuracy of the analysts' reports themselves.
Each of these three conflicts create an incentive for the analyst to praise
80
the issuer and contribute to the price inflation of the IPO shares.
Studies have shown that the market reacts markedly to analysts' reports
and recommendations; 81 therefore, the analyst has substantial power to
influence the price of an individual stock through published reports.
In addition, during the 1999-2000 Boom the analyst played an
managing director and senior research analyst at Robertson Stephens, settled SEC charges that he
issued favorable coverage of a merger without disclosing that upon completion of the merger, he
would recognize a multimillion dollar windfall and that he issued a "buy" recommendation for
another stock that he was then simultaneously selling and telling associates to sell) [hereinafter
Firm Fined]; see also Testimony Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement: Hearing
Before Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs 2 (2003) (statement of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (testifying that the SEC first began
investigating research analysts in 1999 with the suspicion that certain media star analysts were
not disclosing personal conflicts of interest) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony].
77 See Mohammed Hadi, NASD Reaches Settlement Pact with Banc of America Ex-Analyst,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2003, at C5 (reporting that ex-analyst Andrew Hamerling issued positive
research regarding SBC Communications Inc., even though he privately contradicted that opinion
because he was fearful that SBC would deny him access to future information); Deborah
Solomon & Robert Frank, Stock Analysis: "You Don't Like Our Stock? You Are Off the List"
WALL ST.J., June 19, 2003, at Cl (describing sentiment on Wall Street that analyst reforms will
not reduce pressure analysts receive from companies to produce positive research reports in return
for continued access to information).
78 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1056; Donaldson Testimony, supra note 76, at 2
(testifying that research analysts at investment banking firms commonly provided reports on
companies whose offerings were underwritten by the same investment bank).
79 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 76, at 2-3 (charging that analyst compensation at
investment banks was in large part based on the success of the investment banking departments
and that investment bankers evaluated research analysts for purposes of determining
compensation).
80 See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 981-82 (presenting empirical evidence that
during the period between 1988 to 1991, analysts were more likely to issue a "buy"
recommendations if the analysts' firm had an investment banking relationship with the company
(71.5 percent versus 56 percent) and much less likely to issue a "sell" recommendation (0.7
percent versus 7.1 percent)).
Determining whether the investment bank or the issuer is the more powerful party in this
symbiotic relationship can be difficult. The NASD recently fined an investment bank for
threatening to discontinue analyst coverage unless the issuer agreed to future investment banking
fees of a minimum of $1 million. See Press Release, NASD Fines Robertson Stephens and
Former Vice President $350k for Attempting to Coerce Investment Banking Fees (Apr. 7, 2004)
availableat http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2004/release 04)024.html).
81 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1042 ("The securities markets have become highly
sensitive to revisions of analyst estimates and to discrepancies between analyst predictions and
issuer announcements of actual operating results, often responding to either with substantial price
fluctuations.").
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integral and high-profile role in the hyping of IPOs. Because the
analyst is not prohibited from issuing future projections or other
nonpublic information during the waiting period, the analyst often made
a cameo appearance at the road show.82 During the road show, the
analyst would endorse the company and the upcoming offering and
would present predictions along with data, giving institutional investors
exclusive information and creating relationships between the analyst
and the issuer and the analyst and the institutional investors. Although
the market has treated the analyst as independent and trustworthy, these
relationships create a great opportunity for moral hazard and selfinterest, especially in the IPO context in which the only information
regarding an unseasoned company may come from the issuer and the
83
analysts.
E.

The InstitutionalInvestor

Although institutional investors are part of the investing public, in
the IPO process, the institutional investor is given the opportunity to
profit at the expense of the issuer and other investors. As a repeat
customer of the underwriter, the institutional investor is in a position to
insist on access to a scheme that will extract wealth from the investing
public. Institutional investors are anything but passive investors; these
industry players exert influence not only over management in the
companies in which they invest, but also over brokerage firms and
84
investment banking firms, and therefore receive preferential treatment.
In addition to receiving advantageous IPO allocations, the
institutional investor may also be able to exert some influence over the
research analysts at a brokerage firm. 85 Like the investment bank, the
institutional investor has an incentive for the share price to increase in
the secondary market and so may pressure the investment bank and the
analyst to maintain demand for the shares until the institutional investor
has sold its shares. 86 This incentive to maintain the share price may
82 See id. at 1041.
83 See id. at 1079 (concluding that the conflicts of interest inherent in the analyst-investment
bank relationship unfairly prejudice the retail investor by artificially raising IPO share prices "for
companies that have no realistic prospects of success and which subsequently become
insolvent").
84 Institutional investors also receive preferences in how their trades are sold on public
exchanges. See generally Eric C. Otness, Balancing the Interests of Retail and Institutional
Investors: The Continuing Quest for Transparency in Today's FragmentedEquity Markets, 96
Nw. U. L. REV. 1607 (2002).
85 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1050 (explaining that institutional investors are crucial
to a successful underwriting business and that these investors "are unwilling to tolerate an analyst
who downgrades a stock in which they hold a substantial position, leaving them to take the loss").
86 See id. (noting that analysts feel pressure to support the IPO share price until the
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even cause the institutional investor to agree to buy a smaller number of
shares in the aftermarket to guarantee a profit for all of its shares. 87 In
addition, because institutional investors are repeat customers, they may
agree to participate in "cold" offerings to ensure opportunities to
88
participate in "hot" offerings.

These investors are also given preferential treatment by the SEC

and are exempt from paternalistic regulation. 89 This exemption creates
opportunities for participation and acquisition of information not
available to retail investors. 90 One of the perquisites of being an
institutional investor is being invited to participate in IPOs through both
attending road shows and being allocated IPO shares. Therefore, most
recipients of original IPO shares are institutional investors. 91 Moreover,
institutional investors are allocated more shares in "hot" IPOs.92 In
addition, although brokers may request that original investors not "flip"
their allocated shares before a certain date, 93 most brokers give
preferential treatment to institutional investors in this regard.
The market has seen dramatic growth in the activity of institutional
investors in recent years. 94 The major sources of capital in the U.S. are
pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds. Although the
institutional investors have exited the stock).
87 In Liar's Poker, Michael Lewis gives a good example of how a large participant in the
market can move the market by buying and selling until the price is conducive to him doing the
exact opposite. In Lewis' example, a money trader at Salomon Brothers in the 1970s needed to
buy (borrow) $50 million, but every time he posted a bid, the price (interest rate) increased due to
his large bid. Realizing the power that he had, the trader then sold (loaned) $100 million until the
market collapsed and he was able to buy $150 million at the lower price. MICHAEL LEWIS,
LIAR'S POKER 88 (1989).
88 Although the prevalence, effect, and legality of this practice is beyond the scope of this
Article, economists have noted that in non-U.S. IPO auctions that distribute shares pro rata
according to price and size of bids, institutional investors do not feel pressure to bid on "cold"
issues. Matti Kilohaiju & Sani Torstila, The Distribution of Information Among Institutional &
Retail Investors in 1POs, 8 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 357, 358 (2002).
89 One far-reaching example is the ability of companies to privately sell securities to
"accredited investors" under Regulation D without triggering disclosure requirements. Most
institutional investors are by definition considered accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a) (2004) (defining "accredited investor").
90 See Jeffrey W. Markham, Protectingthe InstitutionalInvestor-Jungle Predatoror Shorn
Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 346-47 (1995) (describing the securities regulation scheme as
having two tracks, one for institutions and one for retail customers).
91 See Reena Aggarwal et al., InstitutionalAllocation in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical
Evidence, at 2 (forthcoming 2002) (stating that institutional investors receive approximately 75
percent of all original IPO shares) [hereinafter Aggarwal et al., InstitutionalAllocation].
92 See id. at 8 (questioning whether institutions are given IPO shares in offerings in which
investment banks have private information or in offerings where the demand is high). Note that
this phenomenon triggers a chicken-or-egg scenario: Do institutional investors receive larger
allocations in [POs that the investment bank knows will have a high initial return or does the size
of the institutional allocation restrict demand and therefore create the high initial return?
93 See discussion infra Part IV.E (flipping).
94 See Markham, supra note 90, at 347 (stating that in 1995, institutional investors held more
than half of all corporate stock).
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rise of the institutional investor can be tied to progressive improvements
in some corporate governance issues, the fact that the institutional
has
investor is a major beneficiary of the IPO allocation process
95
practice.
problematic
this
reforming
from
investor
that
prevented
F.

The Retail Investor

Although the participation of individuals in the stock market grew
substantially in the 1990s, 96 the retail investor did not and does not
participate fully in the IPO process. In the 1990s, individual investors
were given unprecedented access via the internet and cable television to
financial news reports and information; however, these investors were
generally excluded from attending IPO road shows and from buying
original IPO shares. 97 Retail investors generally have less information
concerning IPOs than institutional buyers and have the opportunity to
purchase IPO shares only in the secondary market, when they are
trading at a premium. The term "retail" investor even implies that
someone else is purchasing the same good at a lower, "wholesale" price.
In addition, although retail investors have access to massive
amounts of information, some studies show that these investors may
make investment decisions not based on accurate processing of
information but on trends or hype. 98 Investors who make arguably
"irrational" investment decisions have been called "sentiment investors"
to distinguish them from professional arbitrageurs. 99 Some argue that
retail investors are more susceptible to "noise trading,"'10 0 which may
lead to buying at inefficient prices, which will be corrected by
arbitrageurs' trading returning prices to fundamental value.'10
95 See Coffee, Victim, supra note 34, at 5 (concluding that underpricing is a cost of capital
that accrues to the underwriter and the institutional investor).
96 See 2000 Address, supra note 5.
97 See Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 1038050 at *3 (Nov. 15,
1999) ("[O]nly retail investors are discriminated against by being precluded from getting the
benefits available from receiving road show information.")
98 See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise TraderApproach to Finance,4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 19, 23 (1990) (describing how some investors engage in "trend chasing").
99 See id. at 20 (defining arbitrageurs as "smart money" and "rational speculators").
100 See discussion infra Part IV.I (noise trading).
101 See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 98, at 28 (describing how some retail traders follow
positive feedback strategies that ensure that they will "buy high").
However, many retail investors do not make sympathetic victims and some behavior of
retail investors in the 1999-2000 Boom has led commentators to argue that part of the blame for
investor losses lies with the individual investors themselves. See Daniel Kadlec, Investigate the
Investors, TIME, Aug. 13, 2001, at 68 (revealing that greedy investors used home equity loans and
credit cards to finance stock purchases, curried favor with others to get on friends-and-family
lists, let stock earnings ride to escape paying taxes, and manipulated calculations of net wealth to
brokers to be eligible for risky IPO investments); Andy Kessler, Let's Be Frank, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 2004, at A18 (admitting that as a fund manager, the author had dumped original $9 IPO
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The Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Association of Securities Dealers

Initial public offerings and the persons involved in them are
governed by an interconnected group of public and private regulators.
Of course, IPOs are primarily regulated by the SEC, through the
Securities Act of 1933. In addition, underwriters that distribute IPO
shares are members of the National Association of Securities Dealers
and as such are regulated by that organization's rules. 102 The issuer will
also be required to conform to the listing requirements of the exchange
upon which the issuer's shares will be traded, such as the New York
Stock Exchange. The NASD and the NYSE are the two most important
self-regulatory organizations (SRO's), and each organization's rules
must be approved by the SEC before taking effect.1 03 The SROs
propose rules, which are published in the Federal Regulations, and
receive comments from the public before the rules are finalized. These
comments from industry participants can substantially affect the
resulting final rules.104
Until recently, the NASD had long relied on Rule 2110105 and its
Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation, IM-2110-1, to regulate
underwriting practices in IPOs. The Free-Riding and Withholding
Interpretation requires that IPOs be "bona fide public distributions" at
the "public offering price" and prohibits certain practices in "hot" IPOs,
which are defined as IPOs in which the shares trade at a premium on the
first day. 10 6 Some of the practices described below violate the FreeRiding and Withholding Interpretation or other NASD or SEC rules;
however, many of the practices specifically do not.

shares of mp3.com, "the dumbest idea in history," in the first "45 seconds" of the IPO for $60 per
share to foolish small investors who were essentially gambling by placing no limit orders in an
IPO).
102 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("As a registered national securities association under the 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3, the NASD
comprehensively and actively regulates syndicates-including their formation, communications
among syndicate members, commission structure, allocation of securities and fee arrangementspursuant to rules that are formally reviewed by the SEC and subject to its approval.").
103 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000). Because the NASD and NYSE rules often mirror each other
and because the NASD rules specifically govem broker-dealers, this Article will focus on NASD
rules and not their NYSE counterparts.
104 See discussion infra note 317 (describing how one proposed subsection of proposed NASD
Rule 2712 was deleted due to negative comments from the financial industry).
105 See NASD Rule 2110 (Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade) ("A
member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and
just and equitable principles of trade.").
106 See NASD IM- 2110-1(b) (describing certain sales to restricted persons as violations of
Rule 2110) [hereinafter Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation].
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IV. THE PRACTICES
A.

Bookbuilding and Underpricing

The central practice in the IPO process that creates moral hazard
underwriter is the bookbuilding method and the opportunity to
the
for
underprice shares using this method. In the United States, the dominant
method of distributing IPO shares is the bookbuilding method. In this
method, the underwriter seeks indications of interest from large

institutional investors and other wealthy investors concerning the shares

and the price of the shares.10 7 This information collecting happens
during the registration waiting period, often at road shows or at face-toface meetings. This process continues until a few days before the shares

are priced and the registration becomes effective.

At that time, the

underwriter allocates IPO shares to investors who have indicated an

interest in the shares, such as institutional investors, regular customers,
persons on the friends and family list, and other individuals at the

discretion of the underwriter.10 8

Other than the Free-Riding and

Withholding Interpretation restricting the underwriter, its affiliates, and

other industry affiliates from buying the shares and certain restricted

persons from purchasing shares under certain circumstances,' 0 9 the
underwriter has control of the allocation process. 110 Through the

bookbuilding process, the vast majority of the original IPO shares will
be distributed to known investors through the underwriter.

The moral hazard of the bookbuilding process is created not only
by discriminatory allocations, but also by the underpricing that almost
always occurs in the bookbuilding process. Because bookbuilding has
traditionally been the only method of distributing IPO shares in the
United States, ascribing the underpricing of those shares solely to the
bookbuilding method has been difficult. However, in other countries

where issuers may choose from a variety of distribution methods,
bookbuilding has been shown to create more underpricing than other

107 See Francesca Comelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding & Strategic Allocation, 56 J. FIN.
2337, 2337 (2001).
108 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 32 (noting that having a small number
of original investors facilitates the underwriter's task of tracking those investors).
109 See IM-2 110-1 (b)(5) (providing an exception to the general rule in (b)(3) and (4) that the
underwriter cannot sell "hot" IPO shares to fiduciaries, finders, and officers of certain
institutional investors that such sale is permitted if "the securities were sold to such persons in
accordance with their normal investment practices" and "the amount sold to any one of such
persons is insubstantial in amount").

110 See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as

Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2023, 2031 (2002) ("In general, the lead underwriter's decision
as to how to allocate the shares of an IPO is not subject to substantive regulation under the terms
of either the 1933 or 1934 Acts.").
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methods. " 'I
Many economists and legal academics have attempted to explain

why IPO shares are consistently underpriced in the United States using
the bookbuilding method." 12 The most common explanation is that
underwriters discount IPO shares to compensate the institutional

investors for providing price information during the bookbuilding
process. 1 3 Of course, not all of the originally priced IPO shares go to
the investors that provided pricing information, so others also share in
this discount.114 Other commentators have argued that underwriters and
issuers underprice shares to avoid litigation, 1 5 to create goodwill among
investors that would support a secondary or follow-on issue, or to create
"buzz" about the new company. 116 In addition, an underwriter
reasonably could underprice an issue somewhat to ensure that the

offering closes successfully, avoiding the risk of a failed offering.
All of these studies assume that the underwriter is acting in the best
interest of the issuer and that there is no agency problem between the
issuer and the underwriter." 7
However, if this assumption is
abandoned, a moral hazard theory that the underwriter is acting

opportunistically seems more plausible. If the underwriter is acting in
its own self-interest, 1 8 then the underwriter may be motivated to
underprice the issue in order to extract wealth from the market to
reward colleagues and friends. Adding to the equation, underpricing

itself may create more of a premium in the secondary market by
attracting demand, therefore manipulating the share price to rise to a
level that an original IPO share price could not have sustained. 119
III See Derrien & Womack, supra note 14, at 33 (noting that the auction process worked better
than the bookbuilding process and other hybrid models at controlling underpricing in both hot and
cold markets).
112 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1809 (compiling Table 4, which lists twenty-eight
economics articles on IPO allocations).
113 See Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricingand
ParticipationLimits with Costly Information, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2001).
114 See id. at 6 (noting that underpricing is essentially a discount to informed investors for
supplying price information, but uninformed, "free-rid[ing]" investors that do not provide price
information may also get shares at the same discount).
115 See generally Alexander, supra note 25.
116 Interview by Martin Smith with Bill Hambrecht, CEO of W.R. Hambrecht + Co., (2001),
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/interviews/hambrecht.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2004) (speaking during the making of PBS' Dot Con about the IPO process and admitting
that as an underwriter he would often advise clients to underprice somewhat so that companies
could "start out as a winner," which would make regular investors more willing to buy more in
the aftermarket).
117 But see Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1807 (hypothesizing that although agency
problems exist, the issuer may not be motivated to incur high monitoring costs and so acquiesces
to underpricing).
118 See id. at 1810 (noting that underwriter discretion is not automatically used in the best
interest of the issuing firm)
119 See id. (concluding that underpricing, even substantial underpricing, can maximize the
aftermarket price for founders).
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However, because the underwriter's compensation is based on the IPO
share price, the indirect benefits to the underwriter as a result of

underpricing must be worth more than the difference in compensation.
Logically, the difference between seven percent of the underpriced
120
shares and seven percent of the "market priced"' shares could easily
be outweighed by even one additional investment banking client, a
relationship that would generate another seven percent of an issue and

121
In numerous
by brokerage commissions from original IPO recipients.
excessive
outrageously
charging
was
cases in which the underwriter
commissions from customers in return for the privilege of being
allocated original IPO shares, the underwriter was definitely profiting
more from sharing IPO profits with brokerage customers than it was

losing in its percentage underwriting fee. Recently, the NASD
announced that it had fined Bear, Steams & Co. Inc, DBSecurities, Inc.,

and Morgan Stanley & Co. for repeatedly receiving commissions within
one day of hot IPO allocations during 1999-2000 that were obviously
excessive; for example, $100,000 fee instead of the usual $3,000 fee,
$800,000 fee instead of $63,000 fee, and $3 per share instead of $.06
22

per share. 1

The company, however, only receives the proceeds from the

original distribution of the IPO shares: the number of shares issued

multiplied by the IPO offering price. Therefore, the company does not

directly benefit from underpricing or the increase in share price in the
secondary market. 123 In fact, some economists have hypothesized that

120 Determining what the "market price" of an IPO share would be, even ex post, is
problematic. I would argue that the price as of the close of the first day of the offering should not
be used as a benchmark for what the fair price of the IPO share should have been at the beginning
of the offering. The underpricing itself creates artificial demand that may drive the closing price
above what the "fair price" would have been in the absence of underpricing. In addition, the
other practices described below, such as laddering, threatening flipping penalties, and issuing
biased analyst reports, adds to the problem of accurately measuring what the IPO share price
would be in the absence of the moral hazard problem of the underwriter.
121 See also Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1810 (hypothesizing that the commission that the
underwriter left on the table could be eclipsed just by original allocation recipients incurring
commissions from resales).
122 See Press Release, NASD Sanctions Investment Bankers for 1PO Violations (May 18,
2004), availableat http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2004/release 04 033.html. In addition, NASD
charged Invemed Associates LLC in April 2003 for "unlawful profit-sharing activities" in
connection with receiving inflated commissions ($2 per share as opposed to approximately six
cents per share) in return for allocating customers underpriced original IPO shares in 1999 and
2000. Press Release, NASD Charges Invemed Associates with Sharing in Customers' Profits
3
from Hot IPOs (April 15, 2003), available at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr200 /
customer
a
was
cited
release 03_014.html) [hereinafter Invemed Press Release]. One example
who received allocations of original IPO shares in VA Linux Systems, Inc. and FogDog Sports on
the same day in December 1999. Id. On that day, the customer profited $550,000, and entered
into a wash trade in a different liquid security, paying Invemed $140,000 in inflated commissions
for the trade. Id. On the days that IPOs were launched, Invemed's earned brokerage
commissions were up to six times more than on an average day. Id.
123 But see Derrien & Womack, supra note 14, at 32 (noting that some amount of underpricing
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because severe underpricing is positively related to poor long-term
returns, issuers suffer long-term effects from not generating sufficient
capital in the IPO because of underpricing 2 4 One writer has estimated
that for every $1 raised in an IPO in 1999-2000, the issuer paid 57 cents
in fees and un-received proceeds due to underpricing, causing these
issuers to run short of cash later. 25
Agency problems and moral hazard created by lack of information
have traditionally been reduced by monitoring, but in this situation
neither the issuer, operating through the founders, or the future
shareholders have an ability to monitor the bookbuilding process. Only
the underwriter is aware of the price information that he is receiving,
and only the underwriter is aware of the identity of the original IPO
share recipients. This information is not made public through the
registration process or afterward, 26 so neither the issuer or future
shareholders are able to make a determination as to whether the pricing
and allocation process was efficient.
B.

Road Shows

One integral component of the bookbuilding process is the road
show. During the waiting period, underwriters are prohibited by SEC
rules from making written offers 127 to sell the security, but underwriters
may make oral statements in connection with the security. 128 This
distinction allows the underwriters and issuers to hold presentations for
may have positive marketing benefits for the issuer based on the fact that moderately underpriced
issues do better in the first year than "cold" IPOs or substantially underpriced issues). In
addition, underwriters argue that positive investor reaction may carry over to secondary offerings.
See Rueda, supra note 68, at 50-51 n. 192 (quoting the phrase "leave a good taste in investors'
mouths").
124 See Aggarwal et al., Lockup, supra note 44, at 106.
125 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (describing the money left "on the table" as causing many
dotcoms to eventually fail).
126 Aggarwal et al., InstitutionalAllocation, supra note 91, at 2 (stating that the SEC does not
mandate public disclosure of allocations, making this facet of the IPO process "opaque").
127 Specifically, section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits any "offer to sell" through "the use
or medium of any prospectus." 15 U.S.C. § 77a(5)(c) (2000). An "offer" is defined to include
"every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy" a security. 15 U.S.C.
§
77a(2)(a)(3). In addition, a "prospectus" is defined as "any... communication, written or by
radio or television." 15 U.S.C. § 77a(2)(a)(10). Prior to the effective date, issuers may distribute
a preliminary prospectus conforming to section 10(a) that has been filed with the registration
date. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2003).
128 Oral statements generally do not run afoul of Section 5 of the Securities Act. See THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.4[2][A] (4th ed. Supp. 2004). However, such
statements are subject both to antifraud provisions such as Section 12 and Rule lOb-5 and to the
SEC's prohibition on "conditioning the market." See Publication of Information Prior to or After
the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Exchange Act Release No. 33-3844, 22 Fed. Reg.
8359, 1957 WL 3605 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Oct. 8, 1957).
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potential investors at which investors may ask questions and receive
answers about the future of the issuing company.1 29 In addition, the
issuer may display a slide presentation that contains financial
projections, although copies of the presentation are not provided for the
Although the issuer may hesitate to make future
investors. 130
projections about the company that are not included in the registration
statement, analysts may do so; therefore, including a star analyst in the
road show format was increasingly common during the 1999-2000
Boom. 131 Furthermore, the issuer may hold road shows in numerous
cities during the waiting period and may hold smaller, individual
132
meetings with large investors in connection with the road shows.
However, the nature of the road show does not increase the flow of
information to all investors but instead guarantees informational
asymmetry between influential institutional and individual investors and
retail investors. Road shows are generally not open to the public and
instead are only held for invited investors.134133 Retail investors are not
invited or allowed to view the road shows.
Issuers and underwriters argue that road shows cannot be open to
the general public without exposing them to greater liability for
This argument assumes that the
forward-looking statements. 135
underwriter trusts those investors that are invited to the road shows and
therefore can encourage the issuer to speak candidly about the future
129 See Raymond Hennessey & Phyllis Plitch, Next on Regulators' Wish List: Open Disclosure
for New Issues, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003, at C5 (remarking that issuer representatives will
answer questions from invited investors at road shows).
130 See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67174, 67215 (Dec. 4, 1998) (noting that participants at road shows are not permitted by the
organizers to take any materials from the presentation besides the preliminary prospectus)
[hereinafter SEC Release 7606A].
131 See Hennessey & Plitch, supra note 129, at C5 (describing how investment banks routinely
have had research analysts give projections at road shows).
132 See generally Brian C. Eddy, Internet Road Shows: It's Time to Open the Doorfor the
Retail Investor, 25 J. CORP. L. 867, 869-71 (2000) (describing the process of holding road shows
in several cities until days before the end of the quiet period); see also Reena Aggarwal,
Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 115 (2003)
(noting that the 1999 Goldman Sachs IPO included road shows in thirty-eight cities and eighteen
countries, sixty-three face-to-face meetings and twenty-seven group meetings, resulting in
contacts with 1,100 institutional investors) [hereinafter Aggarwal, Flipping].
133 See Adam Lashinsky, It's Time to Open Up the Road Show: What the SEC Doesn't Want
you to Know, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 338; see also Hennessey & Plitch, supra note 129, at C5
(describing how the asymmetry of information between what is given to clients at road shows and
what is given to uninvited retail investors ensures that "the playing field for IPOs isn't level");
SEC Release 7606A, supra note 130, at 67214 (noting that the limited audience at road shows
generally comprises selected broker-dealers and large investors).
134 See Eddy, supra note 132, at 879 (noting that retail investors are prohibited from viewing
traditional road shows).
135 But see SEC Release 7606A, supra note 130, at 67215 (commenting that the oral nature of
road shows may encourage issuers to present complex information only orally, knowing that
investors will not be able to reference the oral statement at a later date).
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prospects of the company. 136 Moreover, one might argue that if road
shows were required to be open to the public, issuers would not make
forward-looking statements at them and instead only provide
information already found in the prospectus. 137 Thus, no investor would
benefit from making road shows more accessible because the result
would be less information overall.
Furthermore, the road show is an integral piece of the
underwriters' claim that IPO underpricing and allocation is necessary
consideration for investors who provide valuable pricing information
during the bookbuilding process. 138 Because institutional investors are
the only investors invited to the road shows, they are the only investors
who can swap price information for IPO share price discounts. Retail
investors are caught in a vicious cycle that renders them unable to
participate in that bargain given that they are barred from providing
pricing information during the bookbuilding process. Whatever the
reason for maintaining exclusivity for road shows, the result is that
retail investors are restricted from fully participating in the market for
IPOs because they are not privy to the same information as the
institutional investors.
C.

DiscretionaryAllocations: Spinning

At the heart of the moral hazard problem facing underwriters is the
ability of the underwriter in the bookbuilding process to allocate IPO
shares to whomever the underwriter chooses. For the purposes of this
Article, this process of allocating IPO shares to designees of the
underwriter will be referred to as "spinning." Although the term may be
used to describe only allocations that are made pursuant to an agreement
that a corresponding benefit has been or will be returned to the
underwriter, what constitutes an "agreement" and a "benefit" is murky.
This Article argues that any underwriter-driven allocation has some
expected or desired economic reward in mind, so the term "spinning"
will be used more liberally.
Most spinning to favored clients is not prohibited under either SEC
rules or NASD rules. Some have argued that underwriters require free
discretion in allocations to place shares in the hands of long-term

136

One journalist reported on this fact after he listened in on a conference call with

institutional investors and underwriters of Webvan and heard much more information than he
found in the preliminary prospectus. See Lashinsky, supra note 133, at 338.

137 See id. ("After all, if a young company is following SEC rules and not making further
material disclosures during its chitchats with professional investors, what does it have to hide?").
138 See Sherman & Titman, supra note 113, at 4 (arguing that investment bankers must
underprice in order to extract necessary information for institutional investors).
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investors, providing a benefit to the issuer.1 39 This argument is easily
refuted, however, by noting that institutional investors flip shares with
more frequency than retail investors. 140 In addition, although the
underwriter benefits from a smaller group of shareholders to track, the
4
issuer may actually benefit from diffuse ownership by more investors.' 1
However, underwriters have other reasons to allocate IPO shares to
particular investors that benefit the underwriter alone, and not the
issuer.
Although spinning IPO shares to investors as a quid pro quo for an
economic benefit has historically been prohibited by SEC and NASD
rules, 142 recent reports have focused on widespread use of IPO
allocations by underwriters not only to generate more commissions, and
even to generate higher-than-usual commissions, 43 but also to induce
future underwriting business. 44 The NASD and SEC have recently
been aggressive in investigating and charging defendants that were
spinning IPO shares to brokerage customers in return for increased
commissions. 45
In conjunction with an investigation regarding
conflicts of interest between the research analysts and the investment
banking department at Credit Suisse First Boston, 146 the SEC charged
that CSFB violated securities laws by allocating shares in hot IPOs to
certain clients of CSFB who in turn agreed to return part of their IPO
windfalls to CSFB in the form of excessive brokerage commissions. In
139 See Aggarwal, Flipping, supra note 132, at 113 (presenting the traditional argument that
institutional investors are "strong hands" who will be long-term investors). But see Ljungqvist et
al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 2-3 (arguing that institutional investors play a slightly different
role, slowly and gradually selling IPO shares to retail investors over a period of time in order to
sustain IPO share price).
140 See Aggarwal, Flipping, supra note 132, at 113 (presenting the fact that institutional
investors flip more than retail investors, especially in hot offerings, by selling 46.74 percent of
their holdings in the first few days); Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (stating that during 1999-2000,
typically 80 percent of IPO shares were allocated to 125 funds, but ninety percent of those funds
sold the shares within two weeks).
141 See Kiloharju & Torstila, supra note 88, at 370.
142 Plaintiffs Complaint against CSFB in SEC v. CSFB LLC (Apr. 28, 2003) (charging CSFB
with improper spinning practices in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, Rule 17a-3, NASD Rule 2110, and Rule 3110).
143 John Hechinger & Randall Smith, FleetBoston Proposes Settlement of Charges Against
Robertson IPOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2002, at CI0 (reporting that the SEC charged Robertson
Stephens with extracting excessive fees in return for allocations of IPO shares). The excessive
commissions were up to 4,000 percent higher than usual and were charged on matching "buy"
and "sell" trades with no economic effect except the payment of the commission. These charges
were settled in January of 2003 for $28 million. See Firm Fined,supra note 76; Invemed Press
Release, supra note 122 (charging that excessive commissions paid by spinnees of hot IPO shares
accounted for one-third of Invemed's total commission revenue).
144 Randall Smith, NASD Proposes Tougher Rules on IPO Abuses, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002,
at Al (recounting 1997 story of GT Interactive Systems executive Joseph Cayre, who received
100,000 shares of Pixar Animation Studios from Robertson Stephens, profited $2 million on the
first day of trading, and then chose Robertson Stephens as the lead underwriter for GT's IPO).
145 See Invemed Press Release, supra note 122.
146 See SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation, 2002 WL 32152004 (D.D.C 2002).
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January of 2003, CSFB settled with regulators regarding both research
analyst improprieties and IPO allocations. 147

Another practice that was widespread during the 1999-2000 Boom
but more difficult to monitor was the practice of underwriters spinning
IPO shares to start-up company executives 4 8 and VC firms 149 in order
to encourage future investment banking business from these individuals.
This practice was also widespread at CSFB, the firm that employed
Frank Quattrone, 150 one of the most celebrated technology stock

analysts during the 1990s and early 2000s. Although Quattrone's initial
trial for obstruction of justice ended in a mistrial in October 2003,
prosecutors retried him for the same charges in April 2003 and secured
a conviction. 15' In just one scenario depicted in Quattrone's trial,
emails between him and Michael Dell were entered into evidence,
showing Mr. Dell as saying: "We would like 250,000 shares of Corvis.
I know there have been efforts on both sides to build the relationship
[between Dell Inc. and CSFB], and an offering like this would certainly
help." In another set of emails, Quattrone apparently allocated IPO
shares of Corvis to Amerindo Investment Advisers after a principal of
that company indicated that he might recommend CSFB to start-up
152

companies in return.
Spinning to current and future customers in return for future
banking business is not clearly prohibited by the Free-Riding and
Withholding Interpretation. 153 In addition, investment banks and IPO
147 See Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, No. CAF030026 from Gary G. Lynch,

Global General Counsel, CSFB Corp., to Department of Enforcement, NASD 3 (Apr. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.nasdr.org (explaining how CSFB's $100 million settlement, including
disgorgement of $70 million in illegal commission monies, in January 2003 was part of its total
$200 million liability under the Global Settlement) [hereinafter CSFB Consent Letter].
148 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (quoting Scott Painter, creator of Build-to-Order and CarsDirect: "When they want your IPO, the banks get their private-client guys to call and say they'll
put you into other companies' hot IPOs").
149 See Smith et al., Something Ventured, supra note 53, at C1 (reporting that Robert C. Kagle,
a partner at VC firm Benchmark Capital, and his family members, received hot IPO allocations
from Goldman Sachs, the investment bank that Benchmark sent most of its start-up companies to
for underwriting services).
150 See Gardner & Gardner, supra note 66 (quoting one CEO as claiming that Quattrone
received 50 percent of the IPO profit he provided clients as kickbacks and concluding, "This is
how Wall Street operates."); Kessler, supra note 101, at A18 (noting that Quattrone made $120
million a year during the time period in question).
151 Although not currently facing charges relating to the underlying IPO allocation practices,
Quattrone was prosecuted on charges relating to email instructions to CSFB employees to destroy
documents relating to an SEC investigation into those practices. Kara Scannell & Randall Smith,
Quattrone MistrialMay Give ProsecutorsReason to Hesitate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at C1.

On May 3, 2004, the jurors in the second trial quickly convicted Quattrone on two counts of
obstruction and one count of jury tampering. Randall Smith, Quattrone Found Guilty on 3
Counts in Big U.S. Win, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2004, at Al.
152 Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Disputed Message: In Landmark Trial, New Momentum
for Prosecution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2003, at Al.

153 See Maynard, supra note 110, at 2043 (concluding that the text of the Free-Riding and
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allocation recipients do not enter into written contracts whereby IPO
shares will be spun and investment banking business will be given.
These understandings are rarely that explicit, even if verbalized, and the
line between "non-binding banter" and quid pro quo is fairly
nebulous. 154
Superficially, spinning IPO shares does not seem to have negative
effects for the investing public as a whole. 155 The lucky "spinnees" are
not taking away any right of a specific individual to IPO shares, 15 6 and
spinning itself does not necessarily inflate the share price in the
aftermarket. However, the practice of spinning in the 1999-2000 Boom,
combined with underpricing, created serious problems in the IPO
process. The act of spinning primarily offends the sensibilities as being
unfair, 5 7 but it may also facilitate market manipulation.
First,
underwriters generally allocate 80 percent of an offering.1 58 Combine
that number with the number of shares allocated in directed share
programs, and the retail investor attempting to participate in the original
IPO distribution has little chance of such participation. Additionally,
the ability to spin IPO shares is the ability to artificially constrict supply
in the face of high demand. Because most of those allocated shares and
directed shares will be subject to either a written agreement or a verbal
understanding that they are not to be sold in the first few days or even
for a longer period, 159 the supply of shares available to be bought in the
aftermarket is very low. The retail investor will buy in an era of short
supply, and may see the price decline once the supply of shares
increases when original allocation recipients begin to sell later.
Furthermore, the underwriter who spins IPO allocations is acting
opportunistically in a conflict of interest with the issuer to maximize the
amount of capital raised in the offering. 160 If the underwriter is hoping
to allocate guaranteed IPO profit to customers as incentive for a future
benefit, then the underwriter will do whatever necessary to guarantee
Withholding Interpretation seeks to prevent "mutual back scratching" among financial services
institutions but does not anticipate investment banking quid pro quo relationships).
154 See id. at 2053-54 (suggesting that spinning may violate NASD Rule 3060, which prohibits
payments and gratuities of over $100 to persons if in relation to the business of the person or the
person's employer, but that proving the quid pro quo connection would be difficult).
155 See Coffee, Victim, supra note 34, at 5 (pondering whether the public is affected by
whether the allocation recipient, who extracts wealth, by flipping paid the underwriter for the
privilege).
156 See Coffee, Spinning, supra note 46, at 5 (noting that investors unable to participate in
IPOs are often seen as victims of spinning).
157 Cf Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule lOb5-1 and the Death of Scienter,
52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 159 (2003) (describing how proponents of regulating insider trading
have difficulty articulating the dangers of insider trading but have "the gut instinct that insider
trading is just plain wrong").
158 See Boehmer et al., supra note 11.
159 See discussion infra Section tV.E. (flipping restrictions).
160 See Coffee, Spinning,supra note 46, at 5.
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underprice is directly related to his ability to spin the IPO shares.
Without the ability to grant these winning lottery tickets, the
underwriter would price the shares with the motivation to raise more
money for the issuer and increase his percentage underwriting
commission.

62

Otherwise, the underwriter extracts wealth from the

investor that should have gone to the issuer and gives it to persons as an
inducement to receive an even more valuable benefit later. 163 Thus, the
processes of unfettered allocation and underpricing to the detriment of
the issuer are inextricably linked.

The process of spinning implicates the self-interest of the recipient
as well. If the recipient is an executive of a company and chooses the
investment bank for an upcoming company offering, then the executive
may be breaching fiduciary duties to the company by using his position
in the company to usurp a corporate opportunity or to accept a bribe. 64
In addition, if the recipient is a principal at a VC firm, then the principal
65
may be breaching duties of loyalty to the investors in the VC firm.1
Although the public investor in the IPO being spun would have
difficulty proving that the spinning activity harmed him, private
lawsuits concerning IPO spinning have been brought by investors in the
companies that employ the spinnees under the theory of breach of

fiduciary duty. Under this theory, the opportunity to buy IPO shares
would have to be closely related to the business of the company or of
some interest as an investment opportunity to the company. 66 In In re
eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,167 shareholders of eBay, Inc. sued

seven directors of the company for breaching their fiduciary duty of
161 See Coffee, Victim, supra note 34, at 5 (noting that if the first-day pop is large, then the
underwriters intentionally underpriced the shares with the purpose of being able to grant "free
money" to designated clients).
162 Cf id. (concluding that the SEC's focus on side payments of allocation recipients is
focusing on the symptom of the problem that the underwriter can control the first-day gains, and
thereby create guaranteed value in an original IPO share, through stabilization techniques).
163 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (remarking that the practice of spinning is "tantamount to
using what should have been another issuer's money to pay for the firm's own marketing
expenses").
The value to be gained by the underwriter must be more than the additional incremental
commission and even more than the nonrealized gain in capital because when Goldman, Sachs
went public in 1999, Goldman underpriced its shares and spun itself. See Smith et al., Something
Ventured, supra note 53, at CI (describing how during its own IPO, Goldman allocated shares to
several venture capital companies that steered IPO clients to Goldman, including Benchmark
Capital).
164 See Coffee, Spinning, supra note 46, at 5; Pocket, supra note 1, at 71.
165 See Smith et al., Something Ventured, supra note 53, at CI (noting that some institutional
investors in VC funds do not like principals being enriched by being able to use institutional
investors' money to steer investment banking business).
166 See Maynard, supranote 110, at 2070.
167 In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. Civ. A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch.
1 Jan.

23, 2004).
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loyalty to the company by accepting IPO allocations from Goldman
Sachs and selling them for profits of many millions of dollars. Between
1998 and 2001, eBay, Inc. retained Goldman on three different
occasions to provide underwriting services.168 During that same time
period, four of the defendants, who were directors, officers, and major
shareholders of eBay, received hot IPO allocations in over 200 total
Goldman IPO offerings. 169 These defendants quickly sold these shares

in the aftermarket for millions of dollars in profit. The plaintiffs allege
that the defendants received these shares as rewards for past investment

banking business or inducements for future banking business and that
these investment opportunities should have been for the benefit of the
company, not the individuals. The Delaware Court of Chancery denied
a motion to dismiss filed by the eBay defendants and Goldman Sachs,
which was charged with aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty. 170 As to whether the facts alleged a usurping of a corporate
opportunity, the court reasoned that even if the allocations were not a

corporate opportunity the directors still had a duty to "account for
profits obtained personally in connection with transactions related to his
or her company."' 171 This case is ongoing.
Led by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the State of New
York instituted a lawsuit that also focused on the "spinnee," not the
73
investment bank "spinner."' 172 This lawsuit named as defendants
certain executives of public companies who allegedly received IPO
shares, as well as positive analyst recommendations, from New York
investment banks in return for taking lucrative investment banking
168 See id. at *1 (recounting that Goldman was the lead underwriter in eBay's 1998 IPO, the
underwriter in its 1999 secondary stock offering, and its financial advisor in its acquisition of
PayPal, Inc.).
169 See id. (Pierre M. Omidyar, co-founder and former CEO, CFO and President, owns 23
percent of eBay and received [PO allocations in at least forty IPOs; Margaret C. Whitman,
current CEO, President and director, received allocations in over 100 IPOs; Jeffrey S. Skoll, cofounder and former Vice-President, President and director, owns 13 percent of eBay and received
allocations in at least seventy-five IPOs; Robert C. Kagle, director, received allocations in at least
twenty-five IPOs).
170 See id. at *5 (reasoning that because Goldman knew or should have known that the
defendants owed a fiduciary duty to eBay and that eBay had investments in marketable securities,
the allegations were sufficient to adequately plead the aiding and abetting allegations).
171 See id. at *4.
172 See State of New York v. Anschutz, No. 02-403885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
173 Bernard Ebbers (WorldCom), Philip Anschutz (Qwest), Joseph Nacchio (Qwest), Stephen
Garofalo (Metromedia Fiber), Clark E. McLeod (McLeod USA). For example, Mr. Ebbers, an
executive at WorldCom, was accused in the complaint of receiving shares in twenty-one different
IPOs that generated a profit of $11 million during a four year period in return for granting
Salomon pieces of twenty-three investment banking transactions, which garnered $107 million in
fees to Salomon. See N. Y. Attorney GeneralSues Top Execs for Proceedsof Hot IPOs, 16 No. 12
ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 20 (Nov. 2002) (reporting that the case alleges that the
five defendants recognized a total of $28 million in profits from the sale of IPO stock and $1.5
billion from the sale of stock in their own companies due to inflated research analyst's ratings,
which were part of the complete spinning relationship).
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business to those same investment banks. The complaint argued that an
officer's act of receiving profitable IPO shares from an investment bank
and then directing underwriting business in a subsequent offering to that
bank is a material fact that would need to be disclosed to the public in
connection with that offering under New York's Martin Act 174 and
Executive Law. Under the New York state statute, the prosecution does
not need to prove that the defendants received the shares with the intent
to return any favor to the investment bank but can instead simply prove
that the relationship between the defendant and the investment bank was
75
material. 1
D.

Friends and Family Programs:Spinning by Any Other Name

76

Issuers can also use underpricing to allocate locked-in'profits to
fortunate persons. Also known as directed share programs, most 177
issuers reserve some IPO shares for "friends and family."' 78 As the
name suggests, this legal practice originated as a way to give a token
amount of IPO shares to relatives and friends of founders and
employees. 79 However, in the IPO bubble, these programs grew to
include not only relatives, friends, and employees, but also potential
business partners, analysts, venture capitalists, members of the media,
attorneys, and other industry players. 80 Although friends and family
shares had historically accounted for a small, single-digit percentage of
an offering, in the last decade these shares have grown to a substantial

174 N.Y. GEN'L Bus. LAW § 352-c (McKinney 2004).
175 See Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Casefor FederalPreemption, 39 TEX. J. Bus. L. 295, 302 (2003) (noting that the Martin Act does not have a scienter
or intent to defraud element).
176 See William Wright, Talking Point: Friends and Family IPO Relic Should Freshen Up or
Be Banned, FIN. NEWS, Dec. 8, 2002, at http://www.efinancialnews.com/index.cfm?nav=999&
action=print view&passedref= 1850 (arguing that when these programs are extended to business
contacts, they are just disguised spinning).
177 But see Kathleen Pender, Be Cautious When Business Associates Offer Access to 1PO
Shares, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2000, at BI (reporting that Hewlett-Packard did not offer a directed
share program when it conducted an IPO for its subsidiary Agilent because the company believes
such program to be "unethical").
178 See Bonham & Norris, supranote 30.
179 See Warner, supra note 20, at 104.
180 See Pender, supra note 177, at B 1 (commenting that directed shares originally went to 10
or 15 friends or relatives but now are given to "thousands of people ranging from hairdressers to
business associates"); Renee Deger, IPO Directed Share Plans Pose Risks, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13,
1999, at B5 (quoting a Silicon Valley investment banker as saying, "A lot of companies are
looking at it as an opportunity to reward historical, prospective or future partners") [hereinafter
Deger, Risks].
Companies can also distribute shares to these groups absent an IPO in either a small private
placement or by issuing warrants or options in anticipation of a future IPO.
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amount of a "public" offering. 18 1 In one highly publicized IPO, friends
82
and family shares constituted 42 percent of the offering.
183
Directed shares became a type of currency in the late 1990s,
with an opportunity to receive friends and family shares approaching
the equivalent of a sure bet. 184 Receiving friends and family shares
1 85
even became a status symbol in some social and business circles.
Because of their almost unlimited value, directed shares were also very
valuable ways to entice or reward business people in a given industry.
Although the SEC has focused attention on some directed share
programs, this attention merely concerns whether companies were
improperly distributing written communications to distributees i8 6 or
making offers 187 before the effective date of the registration date.
The most insidious, but as yet legal, 188 use of directed shares
creates a house of cards in which directed shares are used to purchase
IPO share value, with the increased IPO share value thereby giving
value to the directed shares. Company A is a start-up company without
a positive record of earnings or profits. However, Company A is
planning an IPO. Company A is in negotiations with Company B, a
well-respected company in the industry, 89 concerning a long-term
181 See Deger, Risks, supra note 180, at B5 (noting that traditional programs constituted 10
percent or less of an offering, but have grown to distribute that much for a single recipient).
182 See Renee Deger, DelicateDance With the SEC, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13, 1999, at
4 (reporting that in the mp3.com IPO, 27 percent of the offering was reserved to one investor
group and another 15 percent to musicians) [hereinafter Deger, Dance].
183 See Chris Nolan, How I Got A Chance at Dot.com Wealth, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 1999, at 261
(giving as evidence that the opportunity to receive IPO stock was a guaranteed sure bet the fact
that some persons offered a chance to buy friends and family stock were not even asked to
provide the initial purchase price before receiving the allocation).
184 See id. (describing the author's being offered friends and family stock as similar to "being
at Pimlico Racetrack with Granddad, the trifecta winners printed in the racing form just for us");
Pender, supra note 177, at B 1 (arguing that the receipt of direct shares is almost a guarantee of
making a profit if those shares are sold shortly after the offering).
185 See Warner, supra note 20, at 104 (describing the social cachet of"getting in" on an IPO).
186 See Bonham & Norris, supra note 30, at 233 (warning issuers and underwriters to ensure
that all writings, including e-mail communications, conform to Section 5 and rule 134); see also
Deger, Risks, supra note 180, at B5 (describing the SEC as being in a "tizzy" worrying whether
these acquaintances were given proper information).
187 See Deger, Dance, supra note 182, at 4 (describing the SEC's scrutiny of registration
documents to ensure that the arrangement for venture capitalists receiving directed shares is not
guaranteed in the venture capital agreement and therefore a pre-effective date "offer" or "sale").
188 See Bonham & Norris, supra note 30, at 233 (noting that the SEC is not troubled by the
participation of business partners in large public offerings but is concerned with private
placements of stock with customers and vendors because of accounting issues arising from future
revenues that are not discounted for the value of the stock given to receive that revenue). But see
Pender, supra note 177, at B 1 (considering a scenario whereby the business associate recipient of
the directed shares might be charged with commercial bribery under California state law for
accepting something of value "in return for using or agreeing to use his or her position for the
benefit of that other person"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 (West 2004).
189 Company B does not necessarily need to be a seasoned company. During the IPO bubble,
start-up company founders often put each other on directed share lists in a mutual back-scratching
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relationship, such as a five-year contract for Company B to purchase
large amounts of Company A's products. Company A offers the
executives of Company B some directed shares in the upcoming IPO.
The executives accept the investment opportunity and recommend the
contract between Company A and Company B, 190 which is then signed
and announced to the public. Now Company A has a guaranteed
revenue stream heading into the IPO. The market responds to the news
of the contract and shares increase five- or six-fold in the first few days,
creating substantial wealth for the Company B executives. This scheme
may be repeated by Company A with both large and small customers. 191
One example of this scenario involved the 1999 IPO of Sycamore
Networks. 192 Sycamore, a new company, had earlier announced that
Williams Communications, a large communications company, would
buy $400 million of fiber-optic network-related products from
Sycamore. 193 The market reacted favorably to this announcement and
helped to give Sycamore one of the best first days in IPO history, with a
share price that rose from $38 to $270 at the beginning of trading on the
first day. 194 However, two executives and a handful of other employees
system. See Nolan, supra note 183, at 264 (quoting another Silicon Valley player as saying, "It's
a select group of people who are giving each other money.").
190 Some seasoned companies have policies that either forbid employees participating in IPOs
with the companies' business contacts; some companies require notice and approval. See Pender,
supra note 177, at B 1 (listing SBC Communications and Cisco Systems as two companies with
prohibitory policies).
191 See Warner, supra note 20, at 104 (quoting venture capitalists as saying that giving current
and future customers a "small hit" is good business).
192 Other similar schemes have also been exposed.
One also involves Williams
Communications in a transaction whereby two other Williams executives were given the
opportunity to buy pre-IPO shares in ONI Systems Corp. for $6.32 each. See Gretchen
Morgensen, Sweetheart Stock Deals Common in Telecom, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 1, 2002, at El.
A few months later, Williams announced that they had signed a $30 million contract for ONI
Systems Corp.'s fiber optic network-related products. Id. Three months later, IPO shares in ONI
were offered for $25, with that price rising to $136.75 within the month. Id. One executive's
gain was $43 million, which could be seen as a "huge financial inducement for [the executive] to
buy from that potential vendor." Id. The same newspaper article details an identical transaction
between Michael R. Rouleau, an executive at Time Warner who received 4,500 shares of friends
and family stock in Sonus Networks two months before Time Warner announced a major contract
with Sonus, causing the stock to rise to $83.62 before plummeting to less than a dollar a share
two years later. See id.; see also Jeff Smith, N.Y. Puts Heat on Nacchio Hot IPOs, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 21, 2003, at IC (detailing. another ONI transaction that rewarded Joe
Nacchio, former Qwest CEO, with friends and family shares that tripled in price the first day of
trading three months before the announcement of a contract between ONI and Qwest that caused
the shares to soar 15 percent); Dennis K. Berman, GrandJury Examines Deals by Qwest, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A3 (detailing federal grand jury investigations of several Qwest
executives who received friends-and-family stock from suppliers and possible charges of
depriving the company of the "honest services of the executives").
193 See Warner, supra note 20, at 103 (noting that Williams was Sycamore's only customer
and that the $400 million figure was only a "target").
194 See id. at 101 (detailing how the stock immediately opened at $270 and fluctuated that day
between $200 and $250, making a company with $11 million in annual revenue a $15 billion
company).
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at Williams profited more from the IPO than most other people because
they had been given friends and family stock in Sycamore, in addition
to stock options.'9 5 Wayne Price, a vice president at96Williams, received
$500,000 worth of stock and $10 million in options.1
A chicken-and-egg question arises as to whether without these
shares and options, would the Williams executives have granted
Sycamore the contract and whether without this contract would the IPO
In addition, this relationship questions
have been so successful.
whether the pricing of the IPO shares by the issuer and the underwriter
was intentionally low so as to guarantee profit to these executives as
consideration for the lucrative contract. This scenario presents a
difficult problem assessing both moral blame and possible legal
liability. If the Sycamore executives agreed to underprice the offering
in order to create a currency to entice Williams to enter into a lucrative
contract, then these corporate officers were arguably acting to benefit
the company, 9 7 even if they may have severely decreased the net
capital that Sycamore Networks was able to raise. However, the end
result of this scheme may have been to entice the investing public to
invest in Sycamore, and thus raise the share price, based on the implied
suggestion that Sycamore was a good company as evidenced by
Williams' faith in its products.198 Sycamore's signaling to the market in
this instance is merely a sophisticated form of "pumping" stock for the
purpose of personal gain from cheaply bought shares. The Sycamore
shares jumped 386 percent the first day; this IPO is one of many that are
the subject of a class action lawsuit against Sycamore's underwriters,
CSFB. 199

In this situation, the Williams executives allegedly acted similarly
eBay executives that accepted IPO "bribes" in consideration for
the
to
awarding important business to the person offering the IPO opportunity.
Consequently, the opportunism of the Williams executives to increase
their personal wealth may have negatively impacted Williams in the
form of a contract that may not have been in Williams' interest.
Another creative use of the friends and family program is to allow
195 See id. (listing as one winner Williams Chief Technical Officer Matt Bross, whose friends
and family stock was worth hearly $1 million at the end of the first day of trading).
196 See id. (noting that Mr. Price's options were granted to him when he agreed to serve on
Sycamore's technical advisory board).
197 See id. at 103 (reporting that 775,000 of Sycamore's shares went to employees, vendors,
suppliers, and customers).
198 See id. (citing a fund manager as saying that "without knowing about the friends-andfamily stock, the market could not fairly evaluate the company").
Issuers do not have a duty to disclose details about friends-and-family shares in any of the
materials filed with the SEC, such as the registration statement, the preliminary prospectus or the
final prospectus. Issuers do have to disclose the total number of shares that will be distributed as
directed shares. 17 C.F.R. § 229.508 (2003).
199 See MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. CSFB Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

the underwriter to direct shares to restricted persons under NASD rules

or other questionable recipients.
Although the underwriter has
generally been precluded from allocating IPO shares to portfolio
managers, other NASD members, and other restricted persons, some

underwriters have been able to sidestep this prohibition by having the
issuer direct these shares instead.2 00 Analysts, who are employees of
NASD members, also enjoyed receiving directed shares in IPOs of
companies the analysts covered. 20 1

In these ways, directed share

programs become ways for both issuers and underwriters to engage in
spinning activities.
E.

Flipping& FlippingRestrictions

To ensure recipients of IPO allocations that they will be able to

capitalize on the built-in profit before the price declines, the underwriter
has an incentive to restrict at least some recipients from dumping their
shares too quickly and flooding the market with sellers, thereby causing
the price to decline. 202 "Flipping" refers to the act of selling original
IPO shares at a profit during the first few days of an offering rather than
holding them as a long-term investment. 203 Flipping is not prohibited
under any state or federal law and is common practice. However,
underwriters generally attempt to restrict members of an offering
syndicate and investors from flipping IPO shares. 20 4 Therefore, the lead

200 See Smith, supra note 192, at IC (noting that when charged with favoring investment
banking clients in allocating IPOs, Goldman Sachs claimed that the CEO recipients were directed
shares by the issuers themselves).
201 See id. (describing the pressure that a CEO would feel if an analyst, a restricted person,
requested friends and family shares).
202 The original IPO shareholders in a pump and dump scheme are in a type of Prisoner's
Dilemma. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, CorporateConduct that does not Maximize Shareholder
Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's
Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
The prisoner's dilemma is:
a generic name for the dilemma that actors face when (1) they can maximize their joint
and individual utility by taking a given action, but (2) they cannot secure binding
commitments from each other to take that action, and (3) in the absence of such a
commitment, the best course for each actor is to chose a second- or third-best
alternative.
Id. The first shareholders to sell at the increased share price are guaranteed to recognize some
profit, possibly to the detriment of slower sellers. However, if all shareholders hold their shares,
they can realize an even greater profit derived from hoarding and artificially increasing demand.
All holdings are also subject to unknown, exogenous factors, a fact which creates other incentives
to sell early. However, unlike in a Prisoner's Dilemma, these shareholders have a common agent
who can coordinate their actions: the underwriter.
203 See Aggarwal, Flipping,supra note 132, at 112.
204 See Nolan, supra note 183, at 264 (describing the pressure that underwriters exert on
investors not to flip shares).
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underwriter will usually bind other syndicate members and broker20 5 Under this
dealers by including a penalty term in all agreements.
term, the underwriter may revoke commissions from the broker-dealer
if that broker-dealer's customers flip their shares before the end of a
20 6 In turn,
specified time period, ranging from a few days to six months.
the broker-dealer may penalize specific customers who flip their shares,
regardless of whether the lead underwriter has invoked a penalty bid
against the broker-dealer. 20 7 This penalty may be in the form of an
increased or additional commission or merely in the form of refusing to
grant that investor future IPO allocations. 20 8 These industry customs are

the broker
difficult to monitor or quantify because agreements between
20 9
and the customer may be unwritten or even unspoken.

Underwriters argue that one of the reasons that discretionary
allocations positively benefit the issuer is that the underwriter can
effectively gauge the long-term interest of regular customers and

institutional investors and place the original shares in the hands of a
long-term investor. 210

An extension of this argument would be that

agreements with customers not to flip shares ensures that customers that
211
agree to the terms of IPO allocations will be long-term investors.
However, the immediate benefit to the underwriter is that restricting
supply supports the IPO price and retards a sell-off that will eventually
drive the price downward. 212 Note that the amount of shares that will be
restricted could be very large due to the fact that allocated shares may
constitute up to 80 percent of an issue. 2 13 In addition, a restriction from
selling shares for the first few days would not guarantee that the

205 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.100(b) (Regulation M) (stating that a penalty bid is "an arrangement

that permits the managing underwriter to reclaim a selling concession from a syndicate member
in connection with an offering when the securities originally sold by the syndicate member are
purchased in syndicate covering transactions.").
206 Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure ofRestrictions on FlippingIPO Securities,
74 TuL. L. REv. 883, 885 (2000) (describing the system that underwriters have developed to
discourage broker-dealers from allocating IPO shares to customers who flip those shares).
207 See id. at 886.
208 See id.; Invemed Press Release, supra note 122 (describing process whereby Invemed's
retail customers would pay $8 per share as a commission if they flipped original IPO shares, as
opposed to an ordinary six cents per share commission).
209 See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 986.
210 See Aggarwal, Flipping, supra note 132, at 15 (noting that issuers may be disappointed if
flipping is excessive, reflecting few long-term investors).
211 But see Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 983 (noting that most anti-flipping
agreements are for periods as short as five days, which would not be considered "long-term").
212 See id. at 984 (recounting one syndicate manager's complaint that anti-flipping agreements
create overpricing in the aftermarket).
213 See Tully, supra note 41, at 86 (reporting that 80 percent of original IPO shares in 19992000 Boom were allocated to 125 firms by the underwriters); Aggarwal, Flipping, supra note
132, at 112 (noting that in that sample, 80-90 percent of original IPO shares went to institutional
investors); Aggarwal et al., Institutional Allocation, supra note 91, at 5 (noting that in one study
of 174 issues, 74.26 percent of the original IPO shares were allocated by the underwriter).
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investor will be a long-term investor; the restriction does, however,
guarantee that supply will be artificially restricted and that the share
price will be artificially supported. 21 4 If most recipients sell the first

day, the profits will be smaller and slower sellers may not realize any
profit.
The act of flipping is not necessarily bad for the market 215 or for
retail investors. If the market for the IPO shares is going to move the
price to equilibrium, then investors who wish to sell (who value the
shares less than the current price) must be able to flip their shares to
create liquidity and buying opportunities. 216 In addition, the "price
support" that the underwriter is achieving is artificial and short-term.

Retail buyers who purchase IPO shares during this lock-up period may
then see the price plummet if a large group of original investors sell
close in time at the end of the restricted period. 21 7 Retail investors
would be better served by a regime that allows for no restraint on the
sale of original shares.
Discrimination exists when broker-dealers assess penalties against

lucky retail customers who received original IPO shares then flipped
them, but not against institutional investors that do the same thing. 21 8
This disparate treatment affects not only the penalized customer, but
also the customer who chooses not to flip her shares because of the
threat of the penalty. Assuming that other original investors will honor
their agreements or be penalized, a retail customer may hold IPO shares

that are losing value or not capitalize on an increase in price in the IPO
shares. Although the regulators seem unconcerned with the existence of
flipping restrictions,219 regulators have focused attention on investment
214 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(stating as one of the allegations of the plaintiff class that defendant underwriters allocated to
buyers who would not flip IPO shares "to assure an excess of purchasers over sellers and to drive
the market price of the securities upward" in violation of federal securities laws).
One study shows that only approximately 19 percent of original IPO shares are flipped in
the first two days, so the high trading activity observed in those two days is attributable to retail
investors buying and selling the same shares repeatedly, raising the share price. See Aggarwal,
Flipping,supra note 132, at 113.
215 But see Barondes, supra note 206, at 885 (noting that in a worst case scenario, flipping
shares before an IPO distribution is complete could create a situation where underwriters cannot
sell their allocations because of the creation of a secondary market at a below-IPO distribution
price).
216 See id.at 886 ("Of course, if no securities sold in IPOs were flipped, there would be no
immediate aftermarket trading in the securities, since there generally is no other source for the
securities that are sold in market transactions.").
217 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that several economics
studies show that IPO share prices "fall significantly" when lock-up agreements expire).
218 See id. at 34 (stating that larger investors are allowed to flip by underwriters, but not retail
investors); Aggarwal, Flipping, supra note 132, at 113 (noting that institutional investors flip
twice as many of their original IPO shares than retail investors do).
219 17 C.F.R. § 229.508()(1) (2003) (requiring registration statements and prospectuses to
disclose stabilization practices, including penalty bids, that may be used in connection with the
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22 0
banking practices that selectively impose flipping penalties.

F.

Laddering,Stabilization,andMarket Making

The underwriter has other tools to artificially inflate IPO share
prices in addition to flipping restrictions: laddering agreements,
The term
stabilization techniques, and market making power.
"laddering" refers to the practice of underwriters encouraging or
requiring customers to buy additional IPO shares in the secondary
market as consideration for the privilege of being allocated original IPO
shares. 22 1 Not only does the underwriter in an IPO have an incentive to
discourage or restrict original investors from flipping original shares in
order to maintain a high IPO share price, 222 but he also has the incentive
to encourage or require those same investors to purchase additional
223 Also referred to as
shares in the aftermarket for the same reasons.
"tie-in" agreements, explicit laddering agreements are generally
prohibited by SEC and NASD rules. 224 However, because these
agreements are not written agreements and may not even be explicitly
22
Also, perhaps
verbalized at all, monitoring is especially difficult.
226 and because
because the SEC's position on laddering is not explicit
offerings).
220 See NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee, Report and Recommendations of a
Committee Convened by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and NASD at the Request of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 7 (May 2003) (naming discriminatory imposition of
penalty bids as a "harmful practice" that decreases public confidence in the IPO process)
[hereinafter IPO Advisory Report].
221 See Jathon Sapsford & Ann Davis, J.P. Morgan to Pay $25 Million to Settle IPO Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2003, at Cl (describing how J.P. Morgan settled charges that its investment
bankers had IPO recipients "bid up" the price of the shares in the aftermarket).
222 See id. (commenting that underwriters have an incentive to artificially increase the share
price after an IPO in order to maintain their reputations in the industry).
223 See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 980 (reasoning that underwriters benefit from
share price supports by: (1) receiving additional underwriter business from the happy issuer; (2)
receiving additional brokerage business from happy customers and impressed future customers;
and (3) avoiding shareholder lawsuits under section 11 of the 1993 Act that use price decline as a
measure of damages).
224 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.101(a) (2003) ("In connection with a distribution of securities, it shall
be unlawful for a distribution participant or an affiliated purchaser of such person, directly or
indirectly, to bid for, purchase, or attempt to induce any person to bid for or purchase, a covered
security during the applicable restricted period .... ").
225 See Sapsford & Davis, supra note 221, at CI (describing the practice as involving "secret"
agreements and as being "widespread"); Pocket, supra note 1, at 71 (noting the difficulty in
proving that an investment banker crossed the line between making "vague requests" to buy
aftermarket shares and "demanding ... binding promises").
226 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (describing how the SEC has proposed several times to create a "bright-line" rule
distinguishing manipulative laddering activity from legal stabilizing practices but has repeatedly
chosen not to promulgate such a rule); Notice of Proposed Rules lOb-20 and lOb-21 and
Amendments to Rule 17a-3(a)(6) and 17a-3(a)(7) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

the SEC does allow underwriters to engage in stabilization practices, 227
laddering activities seem to occur frequently. 228
In fact, some firms claim that allocations to investors with a
continued interest in the stock, as reflected in expressed plans to
purchase more stock, makes the IPO distribution more effective. 229
However, binding customers to purchase additional shares in the
aftermarket by capitalizing on the fear of not receiving IPO allocations
in the future230 has the effect of artificially supporting a high share price
by manufacturing demand. 23 1
Traditional stabilization practices, authorized by the SEC, also
manipulate the IPO share price by dishonestly signaling the market that
buyers are valuing the IPO shares at a certain price. Although the SEC
has recognized that stabilization is a form of manipulation, 232 the SEC
has historically allowed underwriters to buy IPO shares at the offering
price during the distribution, even if that price is above the market price,
for the purpose of preventing or slowing a decline in price. 233 The

underwriter can intentionally sell some percentage number of shares
over the original IPO allotment and then buy those over-allotted shares

Exchange Act Release No. 10,636, 39 Fed. Reg. 7,806 (Feb. 11, 1974); Withdrawal of Proposed
Rules Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 26,182, 53 Fed.
Reg. 41,206 (Oct. 20, 1988); Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning the
Hot Issues Markets (Aug. 1984).
227 Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.104 (2003).
228 See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 10 (Aftermarket Purchases), 2000 WL 34224126 (Aug. 25,
2000) ("reminding" underwriters and broker-dealers that tie-in agreements violate Rules 101 and
102 of Regulation M and "may violate other anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the
federal securities laws") [hereinafter SEC Bulletin No. 10].
229 See Sapsford & Davis, supra note 221, at Cl (noting that the securities industry was
unconcerned with charges of laddering for this reason); Pocket, supra note 1, at 71 (recounting
investment bankers' defense that asking clients about eagerness to buy aftermarket shares was
important to gauge the commitment of the investor in the IPO).
230 See Sapsford & Davis, supra note 221, at Cl (quoting a JP Morgan sales representative
who told customers they would be "sort of out of the game" if aftermarket purchases were not
"aggressive").
231 See SEC Bulletin No. 10, supra note 228. This SEC Bulletin states:
Solicitations and tie-in agreements for aftermarket purchases are manipulative because
they undermine the integrity of the market as an independent pricing mechanism for
the offered security. Solicitations for aftermarket purchases give purchases in the
offering the impression that there is a scarcity of the offered securities. This can
stimulate demand and support the pricing of the offering. Moreover, traders in the
aftermarket will not know that the aftermarket demand, which may appear to validate
the offering price, has been stimulated by the distribution participants.
Id. at3.
232 See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 979 (quoting the SEC as saying in 1940 that:
"[tihere are many who feel that stabilizing, since it is a form of manipulation, is inherently
fraudulent and hence should be wholly prohibited under all circumstances").
233 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7 (2003) (exempting stabilization activities from requirements of Rule
16(a); 17 C.F.R. § 229.508(1) (2003) (merely requiring proposed stabilization activities to be
disclosed in the registration statement and prospectus).
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back at the market price. 234 Studies show that during a period of
stabilization, institutional investors, not retail investors, will take
advantage of stabilization and sell shares, indicating that stabilization
measures are for the purpose of allowing regular customers to exit
235
before the price declines.
Another interesting aspect of the IPO process is the ability of the
underwriter to make a market in the same IPO shares. The underwriter
allocates approximately 80 percent of the shares to its own customers,
who when they sell, sell to the underwriter. The underwriter buys the
flipped shares during the time the price is rising and then profits from
the spread between that price and the higher sell price. 236 As a former
makes
CSFB analyst said, this "near-monopoly" of the underwriter
237
barrel.
a
in
fish
shooting
profiting from an IPO "like
These practices, acting in concert, artificially sustain the IPO price
238
levels than if the market were allowed to function freely.
higher
at
Designated buyers, the underwriters, and investors, purchase shares in
the aftermarket at a pre-determined price, signaling the market that
other buyers continue to value these shares at a high price. This
valuation attracts more retail investors to purchase shares at the
artificially inflated price. Unfortunately, the retail investors are at the
bottom rung of the ladder when the price supports end.
Although explicit laddering agreements are hard to prove, the SEC
instituted a lawsuit against J.P. Morgan for encouraging IPO customers
to buy more shares of the same stock after the initial offering and
hinting to customers that aftermarket purchases were necessary to
secure future IPO allocations. 239 The SEC claimed that these practices
violated Rule 101 (Regulation M) of the 1933 Act against offering and
selling shares during the registration period, NASD Rule 2110, and the

234 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1813 (commenting that both the over allocation and
the repurchase artificially boosts the market demand for the shares).
235 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supranote 15, at 33-34.
236 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 (noting that between 1998 and 1999, revenues from
commissions and spreads increased 50 percent); Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1815 (reporting
that in the first three months, profits from market making by lead underwriters equal 2 percent of
the total offering).
237 See Tully, supra note 41, at 84 ("You're the only market-maker, so it's a license to print
money.").
238 See Sapsford & Davis, supra note 221, at Cl ("Regulators have long suspected that prices
of at least some oversubscribed IPOs soared because Wall Street firms had secured secret
agreements from their clients, big institutional investors, to buy shares at higher, agreed-upon
prices after the initial debut of shares in return for an allocation of shares in the IPO."). Shayne
and Soderquist also credit several under-the-table activities of broker as leading to price
stabilization, such as a broker's refusal to execute sell orders or at least to only execute the order
once a complementary buy order was placed. See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 985.
239 SEC v. J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., No. 03-2028 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2003) (entering settlement
agreement).
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Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation. 240 Although the complaint
did not use the word "laddering," the actions alleged were at the very
least pressure tactics designed to have the effect of laddering
agreements. 24 1
The lawsuit additionally alleged that customers
receiving IPO allocations were induced to participate in a "cold" IPO,
Biopure, as a condition of being allowed to participate in an
oversubscribed "hot" IPO, IPIX.242 J.P. Morgan eventually settled this
243
lawsuit for $25 million.
Laddering agreements are also depicted as part of a scheme to
manipulate IPO share prices in one investor class-action case involving
over two thousand claims against 309 issuers and their underwriters, In
re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation.244 One of the factual
allegations that are outlined in the complaint concerns Cacheflow, Inc.,
whose underwriters allegedly conditioned IPO allocations on the
requirement that customers agreed to purchase additional shares in the
aftermarket at escalating prices and amounts in violation of Regulation
M.

245

G.

Lock-up Agreements

Underwriters also control the supply of IPO shares both by

requiring insiders to enter into lock-up agreements for their shares and
by being able to waive these agreements. 246 Most underwriters restrict

company insiders from selling IPO shares within the first ninety to 180

days. 247 Increasingly, underwriters are also requiring recipients of
directed shares not to sell their shares for the same period,248 possibly

due to the growth in size of such programs. This window of restricted
240 J.p. Morgan Pays $25 Million to Settle IPO Allocation Suit, 9 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. &
REG. REP. 12 (Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter JP. Morgan Pays].
241 See Sapsford & Davis, supra note 221, at C1 (describing e-mails from J.P. Morgan
employees seeking promises from customers to buy as many shares in the issuing company after
the IPO as the customers were originally allocated).
242 See J.P. Morgan Pays, supra note 240 (quoting a J.P. Morgan e-mail: "'IPIX allocations
(very strong deal) will be heavily weighted toward those investors that participated in the Biopure
offering.... Given that we have fully allocated all accounts in the Biopure deal.., it is
extremely important that your investors take these allocations. I want to reiterate that we will
provide you with the means to reward these clients."').
243 Id.
244 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also discussion infra Section VIII.C.
245 InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. at 308-10.
246 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1050-51 (noting that the underwriter effectively decides
when the lock-up ends by having the ability to waive lock-up agreements).
247 See Deborah A. Marshall, Latest Trends with Lockups and Other Underwriting
Arrangements, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, at 363, 367 (PLI Corp. Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. BO-OOLK, 2000) (designating the 180-day lockup agreement as "standard"
in the 1990s).
248 See id. at 389.
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supply allows the institutional investors, who are usually asked not to
flip for a period as short as a few days, to exit before the issuer insiders
and without competing with them for buyers. Once institutional
investors have exited, underwriters in 60 percent of offerings waive the
lock-up agreements for insiders.2 4 9 Once selling restrictions and
resulting artificial supply curtailments end, then the share price
Studies have shown that share prices fall
predictably drops. 250
significantly at the end of lock-up periods, 25 1 with VC firms being the
252
most aggressive sellers on those dates.
Because these agreements are entirely within the control of the
underwriter, some investment banks have begun to tailor these
agreements to further micromanage the supply and allow some insiders
to systematically sell restricted shares, thereby staggering downward
price pressure and allowing for maximum profit extraction in offerings
that have experienced large returns. 253 Of course, the underwriter
always has the power to release shares without these terms and can even
time early releases to coincide with positive earnings reports. 254 On the
other hand, if the IPO has been particularly disappointing, the
underwriter may encourage certain insiders to extend their lock-up
periods, thus avoiding the possibility that selling a huge block of shares
would create a much lower market price for those shares. 255 Through
these lock-up agreements, the underwriter has great ability to control the
timing of the sales of large percentages of the total IPO issue and
therefore control the supply and affect the IPO share price.
H.

Independent Research & Analyst Reports

What could be the saving grace for the retail investor, the
independent research report, has also been exposed as another tool in
the arsenal of industry players to extract wealth from retail investors in
the IPO process. If analysts were truly independent, then research
reports about companies entering the stock market would alert investors
249 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 34.
250 See Marshall, supra note 247, at 374 (noting in some cases that the end of the lockup
period creates a 40 percent increase in the number of publicly-traded shares of a company).
251 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 34.
252 See Marshall, supra note 247, at 373 (listing as examples on June 2, 2000, Agilent
Technologies, Inc. (down 11 percent); McAfee.com Corp. (down 14 percent); and Vitria
Technology, Inc. (down 16 percent)).
253 See id. at 377-79 (describing terms that allow for the sale of certain percentages of shares
upon the occurrence of the share price achieving certain goals).
254 See id. at 367.
255 See id. at 387-88 (giving as one example the extension by ninety days of lock-ups of
insiders and VC investors in Preview Systems, thereby avoiding a sell-off of approximately 35
percent of the company's shares).
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to differences between the original offering price and both the market
price of IPO shares and the fundamental value of a company. The
reports could also alert the public about characteristics of the offering
that might create artificial demand, such as 80 or 90 percent of the IPO

offering being allocated before the opening. Analysts could also report
on any suspicions arising from friends and family shares being allocated
to key contract parties, if known. However, during the 1999-2000
Boom, analysts were part of the problem, maintaining positive outlooks

for IPO stocks so that industry insiders, including themselves, could sell
shares before the share price dropped.
By industry custom, analysts employed by the lead underwriter
have honored the "quiet period" following the offering, during which
the issuer is restrained from issuing prospectus material. 256 During this

period, twenty-five calendar days, these analysts do not issue new

reports on the issuer. 257 However, analysts routinely issue positive
reports concerning new issues at the end of the quiet period, 258 and these
reports have a profound impact on the share price. In fact, according to

one study of IPOs during the period 1996-2000, the share price of new
issues rose an average of 4 percent at the end of the quiet period if an
analyst report was issued, and 0 percent if no report was issued. 259 This

increase in share price is crucial to maintaining value for insiders who
are still subject to a lock-up period during this time. Analysts also
routinely issued positive reports at the end of any lock-up period,
260
allowing insiders to sell before the price dropped.
Although the investing public saw these reports as being not only
independent but also the true opinion of the analysts, recent lawsuits
have uncovered evidence that the analysts were issuing reports that their
analysis did not support, 26 1 largely due to pressure from the investment
256 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(a) (2003).
257 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Notice of
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 to the
Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968, at 34,975 (May
10, 2002) [hereinafter Rule 2711 Approval Order].
258 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1808 n.9 (describing as an example the IPO of Corvis,
whose share prices increased in first-day trading from $36 to $84.7 10 per share; however, the five
underwriting investment banks all rated Corvis a "buy" or "strong buy" on the date at the end of
the quiet period, although the share price subsequently fell 96 percent over the next ten months).
In 2002, one study showed that in 87 percent of reports released at the end of the quiet period
during the years 1996-2000, the recommendation was "buy" or "strong buy." Id.
259 See id. at 1825 (marveling that the public does not recognize the extent of the bias and
therefore reacts to the virtually automatic issuance of positive reports twenty-five days after the
IPO).
260 Laura S Unger, Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage
Firms and Their Research Analysts (July 31, 2001).
261 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 76, at 5 (testifying that "Bear Steams, CSFB,
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banking departments of their employers. 262 During the CSFB litigation,
emails were uncovered by analysts that reveal such a scenario. In May
2001, a technology research analyst wrote an email to the Head of
Technology Research, complaining of unwritten Rules for Tech
Research:
Based on the following set of specific situations that have arisen in
the past, I have "learned" to adapt to a set of rules that have been
imposed by Tech Group banking so as to keep our corporate clients
appeased. I believe that these unwritten rules have clearly hindered
my ability to be an effective analyst in my various coverage
263
sectors
The disconnect between analyst reports and true analyst opinion
was not isolated to CSFB, but widespread among the Wall Street
investment banking firms. Jack Grubman, a star analyst at Salomon
Smith Barney, was also an individual defendant in a major lawsuit
against Salomon and himself individually that was consolidated into the
SEC's lawsuit involving ten investment banking firms that resulted in
the Global Settlement of Analyst Conflicts of Interest. 264 Emails
uncovered during that litigation show that on the same day Grubman
rated an issuer as a "buy," he emailed two colleagues that the company
should be rated "underperform" and called the company a "pig. '265 The
Goldman, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Piper Jaffray, SSB and UBS Warburg issued research
reports that were not based on principles of fair dealing and good faith and did not provide a
sound basis for evaluating facts, contained exaggerated or unwarranted claims about covered
companies, and/or contained opinions for which there was no reasonable basis").
262 Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, No. CAF 030018 from Charles 0. Prince, CEO
of Citigroup Global Markets, to Department of Enforcement, NASD 6 (Apr. 21, 2003), available
at http://www.nasdr.org (consenting to the NASD entering factual allegations without admitting
or denying the truth of those allegations, including that: "[i]nvestment banking concerns [at
Salomon Smith Barney] sometimes affected research analysts' decisions to initiate coverage, rate
companies, and drop coverage. SSB's research analysts were generally expected to initiate
coverage of SSB's investment banking clients with favorable ratings") [hereinafter Citigroup
Consent Letter].
263 CSFB Consent Letter, supra note 147 (detailing the pressure on research analysts to
provide and maintain positive research recommendations on investment banking clients).
264 See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 2003 WL 22466156 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (holding
that consent judgments in SEC action against ten investment banks, Jack Grubman and Henry
Blodget, an analyst at Merrill Lynch, were fair, adequate, and in the public interest). Solomon's
parent, Citigroup Inc., was also the subject of a lawsuit specifically regarding one issuer,
Worldcom Inc. Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 2004 WL 1008439 (2d Cir. May 7, 2004). This lawsuit,
brought by certain investors in Worldcom, survived a motion to dismiss regarding the court's
willingness to certify a class and hold that analyst statements could be assumed to affect market
price based on the fraud on the market theory. Id. at *4-7. Citigroup settled the lawsuit for a
record-setting $2.65 billion shortly before an appeal of that ruling was to be heard, reportedly
because the SEC had submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the theory. Mitchelle
Pacelle, Citigroup Will Pay 2.65B To Settle Worldcom Investor Suit, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004,
at Al.
265 Citigroup Consent Letter, supra note 262, at 16 (accepting the allegation that Grubman
published a report rating Focal as a "buy" at $30, even though the market price for the shares was
$15.50, that the company was disappointed with this report, even though it was exuberant and
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fact that Grubman's reports were more marketing tools than financial

analysis was not lost on the brokers at Salomon, who routinely gave
Grubman poor evaluations, including one that stated: "I hope Smith
Barney enjoyed the investment banking fees he generated, because they
come at the expense of retail clients.

'266

The most lurid tale of an issuer virtually purchasing a good analyst
recommendation also involves Grubman. 267

In fall 1999, AT&T

announced that it would spin-off the tracking stock for its wireless unit
in the largest IPO in U.S. history. In November 1999, Sandy Weill, the
CEO and Chairman of Citigroup, and member of the AT&T board of
directors, asked Grubman to take a "fresh look" at AT&T. For a lengthy

period prior to November 1999, Grubman had rated AT&T "neutral."
In consideration for Grubman's upgrading the stock to a "buy," Weill
procured Grubman's children placements at the 92nd Street Y preschool
in return for a $1 million donation to the school from Weill. In
February 2000, AT&T named Salomon one of the lead underwriters for
268
the IPO, generating $63 million in investment banking fees.
Although the SEC was successful in litigation against the major
investment banks that resulted in the unprecedented Global Settlement,
as discussed in Section VIII.A., infra, substantial obstacles exist to
prevent a retail investor from successfully instituting a lawsuit against

research analysts or firms that issue research reports. 269 In a securities
fraud action based on misrepresentation and omissions, the plaintiffs
must be able to prove that the misrepresentation proximately caused not
270
only the artificial increase in share price but also the decline.

against Grubman's judgment, and that the share price fell to $6.48 two months later).
266 Plaintiffs Complaint against Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney
Inc. at 9, SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 2003 WL 22466156 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter
Citigroup Complaint].
267 Citigroup Consent Letter, supra note 262, at 23-29 (detailing intricate relationship between
AT&T, Sandy Weill, Citigroup, Salomon, and Jack Grubman).
268 Citigroup Complaint, supra note 266, at 23-29. Analyst investigations are not limited to
Grubman and Quattrone. The NASD recently fined Merrill Lynch analyst Phua Young $225,000
for issuing biased reports on Tyco International Ltd. In an email, Young admitted his symbiotic
relationship with Tyco, saying, "I am indirectly paid by Tyco." Press Release, NASD Fines and
Suspends Phua Young, Former Merrill Lynch Analyst (May 25, 2004), available at
http://www.nasdr.org/news/pr2004/release 04 035.html.
269 See, e.g, In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351
(S.D.N.Y 2003) (dismissing claims of non-client investors against Merrill Lynch based on biased
research reports for failure to adequately plead with particularity the elements of securities fraud,
including "loss causation"); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 4080(MP),
2004 WL 305809, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (dismissing claims of investors based on
biased research reports for failure to adequately plead with particularity the elements of securities
fraud, including "loss causation").
270 In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research, 2004 WL 305809, at *2.
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I.

Noise Trading

Although not an intentional practice, the remaining factor in the
IPO con game that creates a conducive environment for the other
practices to occur is a dynamic known as "noise trading." Neoclassical
economics theorizes that the market price of a company's shares, as
determined by the willingness of buyers to buy and sellers to sell at a
certain price, reflects all information about the fundamental value of
that company. 27' In its semi-strong form, the efficient capital market
hypothesis (ECMH) posits that the price for a publicly-traded company
will accurately reflect all publicly-known information about that
company and that investing in a company at that price should present
neither an arbitrage opportunity for the investor nor a loss from
overpayment. 272 Proponents of the ECMH would then argue that the
IPO share price is "underpriced" if the true market price will be much
higher once trading is underway. However, during the IPO life cycle,
the price will then decline again, without any substantive change in the
business of the issuer. These inconsistencies lead economists to assume
informational asymmetry between the original IPO investors and the
investors in the secondary market, which may contribute to price
differentials. 273 From what we know about the disturbed flow of
information via biased analyst reports and artificial price signals
generated by flipping restrictions, stabilization techniques, and lock-up
agreements, these phenomena may explain some of the aberrations in
the share price fluctuations in a way consistent with ECMH.
However, informational asymmetry cannot explain all price
movements in the capital markets, 274 especially in IPOs; therefore,
another theory, noise trading, 275 has been posited. According to noise
theory, investors make investment decisions based not only on the
available information, but on "sentiment. '276 Likewise, investors are
271 See generally Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 554-55 (1984).
272 See William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 553 (2003) (stating that the important claim of the
efficient capital markets theory is that the market price for a security will rationally reflect the
meaning of all available information and should not deviate from the fundamental value of the
security).
273 See Ritter & Welch, supra note 6, at 1803 (exploring theories of underpricing based on
different types of asymmetric information).
274 See Allen Ferrell, If We Understand the Mechanisms, Why Don't We Understand Their
Output?, 28 J. CORP. L. 503, 505 (2003) (stating that the arrival of new price information only
accounts for 20 percent of share price fluctuations).
275 See id. at 511 (describing the use of the term "noise trading" to mean trading that sends a
signal that does not contain information, just noise, like a signal transmission line).
276 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 3-4 (describing some retail investors
as "exuberant" and suggesting that they suffer from "overconfidence" in investment ability and
may not learn from mistakes due to self-attribution of gains, but not losses). Noise theory is not

760

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

277
attracted to investments based on factors other than economic factors.
These "uninformed" investors attract other investors (the "herd"), and
soon even professional investors are making investment decisions based
on predictions of where investor demand will focus next. 278 For
example, if an investor can predict the next hot stock and buy it today,
then the investor can sell at a profit at some point before the popularity
of that stock ends. The stock price begins to reflect the demand for the
stock, not just the publicly available information for that stock. Of
course, if investors were always rational, the demand for a stock would
be consistent with the publicly available information, but that is not
always true. What creates this demand can be simply fads 279 or industry
trends. If many people are touting the technology industry or a certain
technology stock, then investors may be attracted to the next new
technology stock, hoping that they will be original owners of the next
280
big thing.
In the IPO context, investors may also be irrationally attracted to
an upcoming issue because of the possibility of regret. 281 This heuristicdriven bias occurs when investors have recently observed other
offerings with large first-day pops and fear being left out of a profitable
opportunity once again. The risk of not investing in a venture that
might also generate large first-day gains seems too great, and investors
clamor to participate in upcoming IPOs whether the financial data
282
supports the decision or not.

inherently inconsistent with the efficient capital market hypothesis. Proponents of ECMH would
explain that noise traders attract professional arbitrageurs who see the profit potential in counter
trading with the noise traders, ultimately bringing the market price back to equilibrium. See
Ferrell, supra note 274, at 511.
277 Under the ECMH, each uninformed investor's trade would eventually be "washed out"
either intentionally by a professional arbitrageur recognizing that the investor overvalued or
undervalued a stock or randomly by another uninformed investor making a different trade.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 271, at 581. In a noise trading situation, however, the
uninformed investors may make parallel trades, acting on the same irrational bias and
exaggerating the difference between the fundamental value of the shares and the market value.
278 See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 98, at 28 (describing the dynamics of positive
feedback trading and the occurrence of speculators "jumping on the bandwagon" and producing
short-term gains before jumping off again).
279 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 14 (noting that in recent history, firms that added "dot.com" to their names experienced
abnormal gains in share price and that after the Internet bubble ended, firms could also experience
abnormal gains in share price by dropping "dot.com" from their names, with no other change in
fundamental value).
280 See id. at 15 (describing as a possibly rational "preference" the choice that some investors
make to use the stock market as a vehicle for gambling).
281 See Shefrin, supra note 61, at 241-43 (noting that in hot-issue markets, the heuristic-driven
biases of similarity, betting on trends, representativeness, and possibility of regret frequently lead
to investment decisions of sentiment investors).
282 See id. at 242 (theorizing that investors demanded participation in the 1993 Boston
Chicken IPO, even though the prospectus disclosed net income losses in 1992 and 1991, because
of the recent successful first-day showings of Discovery Zone and Callaway Golf, explaining why
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This tendency for retail investors to engage in noise trading creates
fertile ground for industry insiders to take advantage of investors in the
IPO context. If IPO shares become popular for reasons other than their
intrinsic value, then underwriters and founders can capitalize on that
investor sentiment to extract wealth for themselves, clients, and
associates. Because of the high amount of noise trading in the 19992000 Boom, underwriters could predict that the demand for IPO shares
in the secondary markets would be uniformly high beyond the demand
for comparable shares from seasoned issuers. With this knowledge,
underwriters could engage in a scheme that would allow knowledgeable
investors to buy before the sentiment demand was unleashed and sell
before the sentiment demand dwindled.

V.
A.

THE PROBLEM

Market Efficiency

The ability to extract wealth from the public investor for the
benefit of the underwriter and the founders does not lead to an efficient
IPO market. Reflected in both the IPO Advisory Committee's and the
NASD's reluctance to completely overhaul the IPO process is a policy
position that to the extent underpricing can be contained so that first-day
returns are in line with historical returns, 10-15 percent, and to the
extent that we can eliminate clear abuses such as quid pro quo
allocation arrangements, then the market should be allowed to operate
without further regulation. However, existing private ordering practices
that are expressly permitted by regulation are not allowing the market to
Flipping restrictions, lock-up agreements, stabilization
operate.
techniques, and unspoken laddering agreements are private actions that
impede the ability of the market to accurately price IPO shares. SEC
positions and NASD rules condone these practices that artificially
maintain IPO share prices. The existing regime, even as improved, is a
"hands-on" regime that favors industry insiders over the retail investor.
The resulting IPO process has been created both by private
agreements not prohibited by regulation and also by explicit prohibitory
regulatory frameworks, such as outdated policies on communications
during the waiting period that allow issuers and underwriters to speak
freely to institutional investors but not to the public at large. Existing
regulation creates asymmetry in information among classes of investors
that leads to uninformed investing and an inefficient market for IPOs.
The framework of rules existing during the 1999-2000 Boom
Boston Chicken had a successful IPO, even if it eventually declared bankruptcy five years later).
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encouraged insiders to exploit the system for profit. Tightening up the
framework to increase costs of exploitation or increase penalties for
breaking the rules instead of stretching them is inadequate. A complete
reworking of the framework is necessary.
Allowing the IPO process to remain conducive to underwriter
manipulation suggests that as the economy continues to cycle, the
capital markets will encounter the same problems in the next IPO boom.
Just as the 1999-2000 Boom was more pronounced than the one before
283
it, the next boom may be more pronounced than this one.
Unfortunately, companies decide to go public during IPO booms that
otherwise may have decided that the costs did not outweigh the benefits,
absent the enhanced ability to extract wealth during a boom period. In
other words, in boom times firms may go public for the sole purpose of
extracting wealth from retail investors, not because the issuer has
projects that are worthy of outside investment. 284 These offerings
attract capital in a sub-optimal allocation of resources. 285 The cyclical
nature of IPOs caused by trying to time IPOs with booms may prevent
companies from accessing capital markets both in boom times, when
underwriting firms are busy, and in bust times, when venture capital and
underwriting firms are not as motivated to support new issues. 286 In
addition, capital is being siphoned off as profits for underwriters and
industry insiders instead of going to worthy capital projects. As a
result, overpayment in IPOs was approximately $1.4 billion annually

from 1970 to

1990.287

Regulators have no problem viewing pump-and-dump schemes as
manipulations of the market in violation of Rule 1Ob-5. Presumably,
these schemes are undesirable because they create inefficient markets in
which investors overpay for stock and then lose money once the hyping
of the stock ends and the insiders dump their shares. The current IPO
process, even the improved version if proposed Rule 2712 is approved,
will continue to be a large-scale pump-and-dump scheme with an
intricate group of colluding participants. The overall IPO process
should be reformed to ensure that an even larger group of investors are
not enticed into overpaying for a stock and then losing value when the
283 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 299-307 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(identifying four recent IPO booms: 1959-62; 1967-71; 1979-83; and 1998-2000).
284 See Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, supra note 15, at 31 (noting that in 1997, 61.6 percent
of companies going public had positive earnings in the last twelve months, compared with 23.6
percent in 1999); see also Mark Lewis, Online IPO Revolution Postponed, FORBES.COM, Mar.
14, 2001, at http://www.forbes.com/2001/03/14/01314back.html (noting that the OpenlPO
auction system provides its investment bank owners, Hambrecht + Co., with stability in booms
and busts because issuers are not attracted to that system in order to get "pops" as "pops" are not
part of the auction process during a boom or a bust).
285 See Allen, supra note 272, at 556.
286 See Shayne & Soderquist, supra note 74, at 977.
287 See id. at 986 (calculating the dollar figure of IPO overpricing in 1990 dollars).
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288
insiders and allocation recipients sell their shares.

B.

Beyond Efficiency--Creating a Fair,Bona Fide Public
DistributionSystem

Economists tend to analyze the IPO process from the perspective
of whether the outcome creates efficient market pricing or whether the
process efficiently allocates capital to worthy sources. However, the
stated purpose of NASD regulation of the IPO process is not to promote
efficiency but rather to "protect the integrity of the public offering
process" and "[maintain] investor confidence in the capital raising and
public offering process. ' 289 If integrity and fairness is the goal, then
price efficiency or allocative efficiency should be secondary concerns,
although this Article argues that the current IPO process does not even
meet these short-sighted goals. During the 1999-2000 Boom, the IPO
process did not provide bona fide public distributions of shares at the
offering price. Arguably, any distribution that pre-distributes 80-90
percent of the inventory is not a bona fide distribution. Retail investors
are lured to the offering in hopes of receiving original IPO shares, but
instead find themselves bidding for shares in the aftermarket, once the
initial built-in profit has been taken. Because of this allocation facet
alone, the IPO process is not a level playing field.
Although retail investors can certainly shoulder some of the blame
for the exuberance of IPO investment during the 1999-2000 Boom,
regulators should create a system that cannot so easily be abused at the
expense of one class of investors over another. Using discretionary
allocations, the underwriter is able to leverage the retail investor for the
benefit of the institutional investor. The new NASD rules preserve this
ability for the underwriter. If investors are going to have renewed faith
in the capital markets, then investors should be able to believe that they
are on equal footing with institutional investors.

288 However, if institutional investors are being enriched at the expense of the retail investor,
the retail investor may be indirectly enriched as well. After all, institutional investors are merely
conduits for retail investors such as mutual funds, pension plans, retirement funds, insurance
companies and investment companies. The end result may be in more profits to the retail
investors that invest in institutional investors. Perhaps the ultimate effect will be that more retail
investors do the bulk of their investing via an institutional investment vehicle. Although the

flipping activity of the institutional investor may increase costs, the profits accrued may
compensate for those transaction costs.
289 See National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 03-79, 845 (Dec. 2003)
[hereinafter NTM 03-79].
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IMPROVING THE IPO PROCESS THROUGH THE INTERNET AUCTION

The primary hero of the retail investor may be technology. The

internet has created many opportunities to democratize other processes,
such as the election process, the corporate director nominating process,

the purchasing of goods, and the acquisition of information, and it has

great potential to democratize the IPO process. 290 In certain areas,
technology could radically improve the IPO process by creating a
transparent and accessible system open to the participation of all U.S.

investors.
In fact, the internet has already revolutionized the
distribution of information to potential investors. However, the IPO
revolution will be the obsolescence of the bookbuilding pump-anddump mechanism and the emergence of the IPO auction. 29'

A.

Internet Auctions

As an alternative to the bookbuilding process, IPO shares can be
distributed through an open auction process, widely used in other
countries; in fact, a few investment firms have recently pioneered online
auctions in the U.S.292 In 2004, Google announced that it would
incorporate some aspects of the auction system into its much-awaited
IPO.293 In the purest form of online auction, the underwriter has either

no discretion or very little discretion in determining either the price of
the IPO shares or the recipients of the distribution.2 94 The highest
bidders receive shares pro rata, with some exceptions. Because the
290 See 2000 Address, supra note 5, at 1 (asserting that the Internet has "democratized Wall
Street" and giving as evidence of that assertion the fact that in 1999, the number of retail
investors participating in IPOs increased, almost solely due to the availability of online IPOs).
291 One of the first issues that arose concerning the intersection of securities offerings and the
Internet was whether certain written materials, such as a preliminary prospectus, final prospectus,
and even annual statements, could be posted on the Internet or delivered to recipients via the
Internet. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange Act Release No. 7233,
60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 6, 1995).
In addition, the Internet also allows for direct
communication between the issuer and the public regarding the company, the company's future
offerings, current registered securities, and relevant markets, thus creating the potential for
violating securities laws via statements, including hyperlinks, on a company's website. See Use
of Electronic Media, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7856, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,843 (Apr. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter SEC Release 7856].
292 Although many traditional brokerage firms accept orders for IPO shares electronically, an
online auction distributes all IPO shares via the Internet in an auction format. The most
successful of these is the OpenlPO system used by W.R. Hambrecht + Co.
See
http://www.openipo.com.
293 See Google, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement under The Securities Act of 1933, at iv
(Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Google S- 1].
294 See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 49854 (July 14, 1999) (initial
public offerings) [hereinafter 1999 Wit Capital Letter]; W.R. Hambrecht + Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2000 WL 987735 (July 12, 2000) (debt securities) [hereinafter 2000 Hambrecht Letter].
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resulting offering price should reflect full demand for the IPO shares,
this process should lead to less underpricing and smaller first-day
"pops. 2 95 However, few underwriters have embraced online IPOs. To
do so would mean the end of a system that grants underwriters a
monopoly on IPO shares that are used to reward and entice selected
recipients.
Although the SEC has issued several no-action letters that relate to
the use of internet auctions for the distribution of IPO shares, follow-on
and secondary offering shares, debt securities, and even municipal
bonds, 296 to date the number of IPOs conducted via an online auction
mechanism have been small in proportion to the total number of
completed IPOs.297 However, this trend may have been stalled by the
stagnation of the IPO market generally from 2000 to late 2003.298 With
the recent increase in IPOs, 299 in addition to new attention being given
to the speculation surrounding Google's IPO,300 the number of online
IPOs being conducted may continue to rise.
In July 1999, at the height of the most recent IPO boom, Wit
Capital Corporation received a no-action letter from the SEC that
allowed it to act as an underwriter, either alone or in a syndicate, 30in1
selling shares in an initial public offering via an online website.
30 2 of Wit
According to the facts provided by Wit Capital, a customer
Capital could place either a limit order, specifying a maximum price per
share that the customer would be willing to pay, or an order with no
295 Clay Corbus, Changing Behavior: Finding Investors, Not Traders (July 17, 2002), at
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/inst/openipo/corbus/index.html.
296 See 1999 Wit Capital Letter, supra note 294; 2000 Hambrecht Letter, supra note 294; Bear,
Steams & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013584 (July 20, 2000) (investment-grade
debt securities) [hereinafter 2000 Bear Steams Letter]; Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2000 WL 1013585 (July 20, 2000) (follow-on, secondary, and combination offerings) [hereinafter
2000 Wit Capital Letter].
297 See Lewis, supra note 284 (reporting that most IPOs in 2001 were still being conducted in
the traditional way, although Walt Cruttenden, CEO of E*Offering, had predicted that by 2002,
80 percent of IPOs would be online).
298 Some firms that promised the online IPO auction suffered after the 1999-2000 boom to the
point of elimination, such as E*Offering. See id.
299 See Raymond Hennessey, China Life, Four Others Join Revived IPO Market, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 18, 2003, at C5 (discussing the continued revival of the 2003 IPO market and commenting
that currently seasoned companies are more attractive to investors in IPOs than riskier ventures)
[hereinafter Hennessey, Revived].
300 See Carolyn Said, Quattrone's Trial: A Catalystfor Change, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003,
at II (describing Google's possible Dutch auction IPO as reflective of the shift in Silicon Valley
to "a new world order" and not the "favoritism and cronyism" of 1999).
301 See 1999 Wit Capital Letter, supra note 294, at *22.
302 Only persons registered as customers of Wit Capital would be eligible to place a bid. In
registering, would-be customers provide information on affiliations with restricted persons,
investment objectives and experience, net worth, and income. See id. at *4. Presumably, this
information would allow Wit Capital to screen customers to ensure that the investment is suitable
to that customer. NASD Rule 2310 (requiring members to only recommend investments to
customers that are suitable to that customer's need and financial situation).
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price component, like a market order; both orders would indicate the
number of shares requested. 303 Then, prior to the registration statement
becoming effective, Wit Capital would allocate shares on a "first-come,
first-served" basis according to the date and time of each order. 304 The
no-action letter allowed Wit Capital to then ask bidders to reconfirm
their "indications of interest" at the set price and amount via an email
sent no earlier than 48 hours before the registration statement would be
effective. 30 5 At the time the bidder reconfirmed the bid, the bid would
become an offer that Wit Capital could then accept after the registration
became effective, at which time a final prospectus would be sent to the
customer. 306 In the no-action letter, Wit Capital stated that it "generally
does not allocate more than 100 shares in an offering to any customer
until all customers who have placed conditional offers to buy shares in
the offering have been allocated 100 shares. '307 However, the letter
also stated that: "at the request of the issuer, [we] may set aside a
specified number of shares in an offering for certain categories of
employees or customers of the issuer or other persons with an affinity
relationship with the issuer. '308
In 2000, Wit Capital sought and obtained an additional no-action
letter extending its online operations to follow-on, secondary, and
combination offerings. 30 9 The auction format proposed by Wit Capital
in its 2000 letter was similar in some respects to the 1999 method but
had all the characteristics of a Dutch auction method.3 10 The letter does
not indicate whether Wit Capital would then use this more mechanical
method for initial public offerings. In the proposed Dutch offering, the
bidders would be given a maximum bid price and a minimum bid price
and would be asked to bid for a number of shares between those two
prices. 311 The price would then be set at the highest price for which all
shares would be sold up to the maximum bid price. 31 2 If not enough
customers bid for shares at even the minimum price, then the minimum
price would be the share price and the issuer would sell all the shares to
the underwriter at the price under a firm commitment underwriting. 313
If bids at the share price exceed the number of shares available, the
303
304
305
306
307
308

See 1999 Wit Capital Letter, supra note 294, at *5.
See id. at *7.
See id. at *9,23.
Seeid.at*10-11.
See id.at*7.
See id. (noting that any directed share program would be described in the "Plan of
Distribution" section of the prospectus).
309 See 2000 Wit Capital 2000 Letter, supra note 296, at *7-8.
310 See id. at *1 (describing the method as a transparent, open auction and referring to its
method as the "Vostockm auction method of distribution").
311 See id. at *3.

312 See id.at*4.
313 See id.
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issuer would allocate the shares to the bidders based strictly on the
14
highest price bid by the bidder and the time of the bid.-3 However, the
issuer and the underwriter could agree to adjust the allocation to ensure
that at least 25 percent of the allocation goes to small bids or large bids,
31 5
as the case may be.
During this auction, any internet user could view the aggregate
demand in the auction at each price point, making the pricing of the
shares virtually transparent. 31 6 Each bidder also would have the ability
317 In
to change or cancel bids prior to the termination of the auction.
further eliminating any
addition, all bids would be anonymous,
318
practice.
discriminatory allocation
Following the issuance of no-action letters like these, the potential
for online IPOs seemed unlimited, although some investment
319 Other investment firms
professionals took a wait-and-see attitude.
320 only to have the IPO
began to market their own online services,
market decline severely with the general stock market decline in the
second half of 2000. Although a few online IPOs were conducted in
1999 and the first half of 2000,321 many investment firms halted plans
for online IPOs and returned their business to more traditional
322 Online IPOs suffered
underwriting practices, including Wit Capital.
doubly during this period because companies that were most interested
in doing technologically-advanced capital raising were technology
314 See id.
315 See id.
316 See id. at *1.
317 See id. at *4.
318 See id. In a 2000 address to the San Diego Securities Institute, Laura S. Unger, then an
SEC commissioner, described two ways to distribute IPO shares on the Internet without violating
SEC rules on pre-effective sales. See 2000 Address, supra note 5, at 2. First, brokers can collect
"indications of interest" in IPO shares that are reconfirmed after effectiveness and pricing. Id.
Alternatively, brokers may collect "conditional offers to buy" shares within a certain price range,
which are accepted after effectiveness, pricing, and notification to investors. Id.
319 See Emily S. Plishner, E-Bonds, Will They Fly?, CFO: MAGAZINE FOR SENIOR FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVES, Mar. 2001 ("Many investors will likely sit on the sidelines until one system is
established as a de facto standard.").
320 See 2000 Bear Stearns Letter, supra note 296, at *1 (describing Bear, Steams' Dutch
Auction internet Syndication System ("DAiSSsm");http://www.bearstearns.com (last visited Jan.
30, 2004).
321 See 2000 Address, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that "about a dozen" firms by January 2000
had created online systems to distribute IPOs and that 38 percent of all IPOs in the last half of
1999 had an online component). However, these IPOs were not all exclusive online IPO
auctions. WR Hambrecht + Co.'s OpenIPO website shows that the firm conducted three online
IPO auctions in 1999, one in 2000, two in 2001, one in 2002, and two in 2003. See
http://www.openbook.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
322 Following an acquisition of Soundview Group, a traditional investment bank, in 2000, Wit
Capital focused on traditional underwriting and is now part of Charles Schwab as Schwab
Soundview Capital Markets. See http://www.witcapital.com (last visited March 1, 2004). In
addition, Bear, Stearns has also abandoned its DAiSSm method of distributing debt securities.
See http://www.bearstearns.com (last visited March 1, 2004).
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companies, companies that were hit hardest during this economic
downturn.
However, the death of the online IPO auction has been greatly
exaggerated. At least one investment bank, H.R. Hambrecht + Co., 323
continued to invest in the future of online IPOs and has recently
conducted several successful online IPOs during the recent resurgence
324
in IPO activity.
B.

The Google IPO

In Google's April 29, 2004 registration statement, founders Larry
Page and Sergey Brin announced that the Google IPO would utilize an
auction method for pricing and distribution of shares. 325 The founders
explained that the inefficiencies inherent in the traditional IPO process
are damaging to both the issuer and the long-term investor. 326
Interestingly, the registration statement urged investors to bid only if
they were interested in the company long-term. 327 Google received
some backlash in the media for pretending to have a democratic auction
process when the auction actually would only be accessible by
customers who were able to pay the high price per share range, and
meet minimum account balances. 32 8 Shortly thereafter, on May 21,
Google amended its registration statement, naming thirty-one additional
banks, including smaller and online banks that would also be able to
distribute shares in the auction. 329 The addition of these investment
banks democratized the IPO process to the extent that individual
investors would have the same opportunity to receive original IPO
shares as industry investors.
However, the Google auction, which was eventually conducted on
August 18, 2004, did not unleash the power of a true Dutch auction to
create market pricing for the original IPO shares. Instead, the issuer
stated a projected range of $85 to $95 per share and priced the shares at

323 See http://www.openbook.com (last visited March 1, 2004).
324 See id. (listing the tombstones of completed online initial offerings, including Outpost.com
and Peet's Coffee & Tea).
325 See Google S-1, supra note 293, at iv-v.
326 Id.at iv.
327 Id. at x.

328 See Ben White, Aiming to Auction Its Way to More "Inclusive" IPO: Complex Scheme
Could Confuse Small Investors, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2004, at El; Kevin J. Delaney & Ruth
Simon, Google's IPO Draws Lukewarm Interest From Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
2004, at C 1.
329 See Google, Inc. Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 Registration Statement under the
Securities Act of 1933, at 25, 93. Three underwriters would later drop from the IPO, reducing the
number of underwriters to eight. See Amendment No. at 25.

2005]

MORAL HAZARD AND THE IPO

769

the bottom of that range. 330 With the price of Google shares then
soaring a modest 50 percent over the next six weeks, 33 1 one is left to
wonder whether even with the auction model, the shares were
underpriced.
The Google IPO was a promising breakthrough in the market for
IPOs in that the company showed the investment banks that it will
engage in an IPO on its terms and according to its rules.332 Google did
not rush to market during the technology boom and came to the
negotiating table as a seasoned company with some power. Unlike
many start-ups, Google did not have to court investment banks or rely
on VC relationships to make introductions. Because of this power,
Google was uncommonly able to determine unilaterally who would
underwrite the IPO and how the IPO would proceed.
C.

Future Effects on IPO Practice

The availability of online IPO auction mechanisms promise a much
more democratic IPO process whereby the larger public has the
opportunity to participate. Theoretically, the enhanced transparency of
pricing and participation of investors should create a more efficient
market for IPOs in which the offering price more accurately reflects the
value investors place on the IPO shares.333 The elimination of the
bookbuilding method would completely transform the IPO process,
eliminating opportunities for profit allocations that spawn other unfair
practices such as spinning and laddering. Half of this combination has
already been realized with the ability of issuers to conduct online IPO
auctions. Although not all of the firms that proposed transforming their
underwriting practice in this way in 1999 and 2000 are currently
offering an IPO auction process, the mechanism is still alive and
gaining in the IPO underwriting market. Any remaining regulatory
hurdles to the emergence of the online IPO as a common practice may
330 Press Release, Google Inc., Google Inc. Requests Effectiveness of IPO Registration
Statement (Aug. 18, 2004), at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/reg2_statement.html. See
Amendment No. 9 at cover page; Google Inc., Final Prospectus, at cover page.
331 See Gregory Zuckerman & Kevin J. Delaney, Google's Stock Rises Near 50%, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 9, 2004, at C1.
332 Editorial, Review and Outlook: Google 's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20.
333 The WR Hambrecht + Co. website provides selected IPO pricing information for
completed offerings, which tends to show that online auctions avoid the "pops" of bookbuilding
IPOs. See http://www.openbook.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (listing the opening/closing
prices of Ravenswood ($10.50/10.88); Andover.net ($18.00/63.38); Nogatech, Inc. ($12.00/9.41);
Peet's Coffee & Tea ($8.00/9.38); Briazz, Inc. ($8.00/8.03); and Overstock.com
($13.00/S13.03)). But see Laura S. Unger, Raising Capital on the Internet, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.
1205, 1207-08 (2001) (describing how in the online IPO auction of shares of Peet's Coffee &
Tea, the share price more than doubled in the first few days) [hereinafter Unger, Raising Capital].
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be eliminated. 3
However, issuers generally choose an underwriter early in the
decision-making process, and unless that underwriter is one of the few
firms that offer online IPOs, that underwriter probably will not counsel
the issuer to investigate the pros and cons of an online IPO. The
underwriter would be not only giving up some control of the
underwriting process to another underwriter, but also giving up control
of the allocation process, a source of lucrative opportunism. Therefore,
underwriters may be loath to implement their own auction mechanisms
and thereby eliminate an allocation system that allows them to reward
their regular customers. The industry power that allows the rare issuer
such as Google to lay new ground rules with Wall Street investment

banks is the exception, not the rule. The founders of the IPO company
also may not want to forego the potential upside of reserved directed
shares for friends and family and the ability to build in gain for
themselves.

Founders often rely on VC firms to choose investment

banks, and VCs also may be hesitant to forego instant profits. 3 In
addition, neither institutional investors spoiled by huge short-term gains
from IPO allocations nor arbitrageurs and day traders will be attracted

to the auction structure.33 6 Ironically, because the auction process may
entail "winner's curse" problems, the share price may actually decline
the first day. 3 The main players that gain from the bookbuilding
system are necessarily the ones that will have to choose to adopt an

alternative system, which may hamper the growth of the online IPO.
Although a paradigm shift will not happen overnight, if issuers
begin to use online auctions to conduct offerings, then the role of the
underwriter, and the underwriter's power, will be diminished.

338

Just as

334 See IPO Advisory Report, supra note 220, at 9 (urging the SEC to eliminate pricing rules
that might make true auction pricing burdensome); National Association of Securities Dealers,
Notice to Members 03-72, 778-79 (Nov. 2003) (proposing text of new NASD Rule 2712 and
requesting comments on potential regulation to ensure integrity in IPO pricing, including
"requiring underwriters to... [u]se an auction or other system to collect indications of interest to
help establish the final IPO price") [hereinafter NTM 03-72].
335 See Dan Ackman, A Better, More Honest IPO, FORBES, Oct. 17, 2002, at
http://www.forbest.com/2002/10/17/1017ipo_print.html (noting that venture capitalists were
more tempted to steer an IPO to a traditional investment banking firm, not OpenlPO).
336 See Coffee, Dutch Auctions, supra note 26, at 5 (suggesting that the once-ignored
individual investor will have to fill the void in auction distributions if they will be successful).
337 See Google S-1, supra note 293, at 18 (describing in the "Risk Factors" section how
"investors may experience significant losses" due to the winner's curse and how "[s]uccessful
bidders hoping to capture profits shortly after our Class A common stock begins trading may be
disappointed")
338 Smaller firms have even conducted small offerings over the Internet without an
underwriter. "Direct Public Offerings," or "DPOs" have become an alternative for small
businesses to avoid underwriting fees and offer shares to the public directly. Because these
offerings are generally either under the $1 million threshold for [rule] offerings or under the $5
million threshold for [rule] offerings, the issuers save on both underwriting fees and legal fees.
See Thomas P. Gallagher & Courtenay C. Hansen, N.J. LAW., Aug. 1999, at 39; Unger, Raising
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the power of the internet has revolutionized the buying and selling of
residential real estate, 339 technology may allow issuers to see
underwriters as mere middlemen that stand between sellers and buyers.
To remain competitive, underwriters will be forced to offer issuers
something more than just a distribution channel to potential investors.
Underwriters will necessarily have to compete based on the quality of
their advice, the strength of their reputation, and their ability to brand
issuers.

VII.

REGULATORY REFORM

A.

IPO Process

In response to public outcry regarding unfairness in the IPO
process following the end of the 1999-2000 Boom, the NASD has
proposed two new rules to improve the IPO process. At the same time,
the SEC created and charged the IPO Advisory Committee to analyze
the IPO process and recommend improvements.
1.

NASD/NYSE IPO Advisory Committee Report

On August 22, 2002, the former Chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt,
had asked the former Chairman of the NYSE, Dick Grasso, and the
Chairman of the NASD, Robert R. Glauber, to convene a committee of
leaders in both the business and academic communities 340 to complete
this project. 34 1 This committee was to focus on why IPO prices would
increase dramatically at the beginning of an offering and how this
phenomenon contributed to "aggressive" and possibly illegal
underwriting practices. 342 In May 2003, the NYSE/NASD IPO
Advisory Committee released a document entitled "Report and
Recommendations" that detailed the committee's review of the initial
Capital,supra note 333, at 1207.
339 See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Processin an InternetAge: Obstacles
to Maximum Effectiveness andPolicy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183 (2000).
340 The committee comprised fourteen members of the investing and finance community,
including the President of the American Association of Individual Investors: Geoffrey C. Bible
(chair), John J. Brennan, Peter A. Brooke, Richard M. Burnes, Jr., Myra Drucker, William R.
Hambrecht, Martin Lipton, John D. Markese, Robert C. Mendelson, Leon E. Panetta, Jay R.
Ritter, Larry W. Sonsini, Daniel P. Tully, and John L. Vogelstein. See IPO Advisory Report,
supra note 220, at I.
341 See id at Appendix A (letter from Mr. Pitt to Mr. Grasso and Mr. Glauber dated August
22, 2002 asking that the committee review the IPO underwriting process, "particularly price
setting and allocation practices").
342 See id.
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public offering process, its role in creating some of the problems
observed in the IPO market of the 1990's and recommended
improvements to restore the integrity of that process. 343 The committee
made twenty recommendations to "promote transparency in pricing and
avoid aftermarket distortions," "eliminate abusive allocation practices,"
"improve the IPO information flow and information access," and
"improve the quality
of underwriter performance and public awareness
344
regarding IPOs."
Although the committee did not denounce the bookbuilding
process, the committee recognized that investors are losing confidence
in the IPO market due to the "widespread perception that IPOs are
parceled out disproportionately to a few, favored investors, be they
large institutions, powerful individuals or 'friends and family' of the
issuer., 34 5 Therefore, many of the committee's recommendations are
specifically directed at limiting, but not eliminating, the discretion of
the underwriter to make these allocations.3 46 Specifically, the report
recommends prohibiting the allocation of shares in an IPO (not just a
"hot" IPO) to any executive officers or directors in a company that is an
"investment banking client" of the underwriter3 4 7 in order to eliminate
any quid pro quo allocations. 348 The committee also recommended
adopting "a more explicit restriction" on the prohibition against an
underwriter allocating shares of an IPO in consideration of a promise of
an excess commission or other return of profits, limiting "friends and
family" programs to 5 percent of a particular offering, and requiring that
349
the underwriter disclose the final IPO allocations to the issuer.
However, although the report supported alternatives to bookbuilding,
343 See id.
344 See id. at iv.
345 See id. at 2.
346 See id. at 10 (affirming that underwriters should be able to allocate some proportion of an
offering to "their best customers in order to maintain client relationships"). But see Hambrecht,
supra note 73 (characterizing the report's acceptance of discretionary allocation by the
underwriter as "a mistake").
347 See IPO Advisory Report, supra note 220, at 11 (making recommendation #9: "Prohibit the
allocation of IPO shares (1) to executive officers and directors (and their immediate families) of
companies that have an investment banking relationship with the underwriter, or (2) as a quid pro
quo for investment banking business"). The report also "encourage[s] the SEC and SROs to
consider if and to what extent the existence of a previous investment banking relationship should
trigger similar restrictions on allocations to directors and executive officers." Id.
348 Quid pro quo allocations have been prohibited by both SEC and SRO rules, but the
committee reiterated in recommendation #11 that existing prohibitions be strengthened. Id. at 12.
349 Id. at 12-13, 16. This last recommendation requiring underwriters to supply issuers with
allocation information could be helpful if either the underwriter disclosed historical allocation
figures at the outset of the issuer-underwriter relationship or contracted with the issuer ex ante on
a specific allocation procedure. Such information or agreements could help issuers decide
between investment firms and might possibly cause firms to compete on this basis. However,
information divulged only after the offering was complete would not be as useful because an
issuer is generally not a repeat player in the IPO market.
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such as Dutch auctions, the report clearly states that the Committee does

not believe that bookbuilding is "inherently flawed" or that regulation
should eliminator or even disfavor the traditional bookbuilding
method.35 °

The committee also commented on both flipping practices and
laddering practices. Although underwriters might argue that both
penalizing those original shareholders who flip their shares and
encouraging original shareholders to purchase more shares in the
aftermarket help support the price of and maintain a market for the IPO
stock,35 ' the committee recognized that these practices have harmful
effects on the retail investor.35 2 First, laddering is prohibited by both
Regulation M and the anti-manipulation and anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. 35 3 The committee thereby encouraged the SROs and the
SEC to "redress and prevent" these already illegal practices. 354 Second,
the committee recommended several improvements to underwriters'
customary practices of penalizing only retail investors who flip shares
and not institutional investors and regular brokerage customers. 355
Unless a penalty bid has been imposed on a syndicate member, or
possibly the entire syndicate, then an underwriter could not impose a
penalty bid on a retail investor. 356 In addition, the prospectus would
have to clearly indicate whether the underwriter will waive lock-up
357
requirements for directors, officers, and certain pre-IPO shareholders.
Furthermore, before any of these shareholders can sell shares before the
lock-up agreement, the underwriter will have to announce the sale to the
investment community and the issuer would have to file a report on
Form 8-K.35 8

Interestingly, the report seems to indicate that underwriters are not
the only group whose actions led to IPO abuses. The report also has

350 See id. at 1, 9 ("The market, and not regulators, should determine whether bookbuilding, a
Dutch auction or another method is desirable for a particular IPO."). But see Hambrecht, supra
note 73 (criticizing his fellow members of the IPO Advisory Committee for not recognizing that
bookbuilding is "closed and transparent" and that discretionary allocation of IPO shares by
underwriters is the root cause of the abuses inherent in the current IPO system).
351 See Randall Smith, SEC 'Laddering' Inquiry Reaches Two Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,
2002, at C l (relating underwriters' view that asking customers about interest in IPO shares in the
aftermarket helps underwriters place shares with long-term investors).
352 See IPO Advisory Report, supra note 220, at 6 (recommendation #3: "Redress and prevent
prohibited IPO laddering").
353 17 C.F.R. § 242.101; SEC Bulletin No. 10, supra note 228.
354 See IPO Advisory Report, supranote 220, at 6.
355 See id. at 7.
356 See id.
357 See id. at 16 (suggesting that all material terms, including terms relating to hedging, be
disclosed in the prospectus, as well as any preexisting plans to waive those terms).
358 See id. at 17-18 (noting that pre-transaction disclosure of insider sales is more helpful and
appropriate than disclosure after the sale).
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that affect issuers, 359 retail investors, 36 and potential
recommendations
36 1
"spinnees."

In this regard, two recommendations focus on agency

problems created by conflicts between directors and officers and their
corporations. First, the committee recommends that the issuer create a

pricing committee from its board of directors with at least one
independent director. 362 This mechanism could result in eliminating the
conflict between the opportunism of individual founders and the longterm capital needs of the issuer.

In addition, the report also

recommends that corporations institute a policy concerning whether the
directors and executive officers of that corporation may accept
allocations of IPO shares from an underwriter and under what
circumstances. 363 A restrictive policy could eliminate the potential for a

key person to make decisions for the company based on a lucrative IPO
allocation or could preserve that IPO opportunity for the corporation,
not the individual.
2.

Rule 2790

New Rule 2790 was proposed on October 15, 1999, but was
amended by the NASD five times 364 over the course of four years before
359 See id. at 4 ("Require each issuer to establish an IPO pricing committee of its board of
directors-including at least one director who is independent of management (if any director
qualifies)-to oversee the pricing problem."
360 See id. at 6 ("Prohibit, for the first trading day following the IPO, the placing of unpriced
orders to purchase an issuer's shares."); see also id. at 19 ("Launch an education campaign for
new issuers and IPO investors.").
361 See id. at 11 ("Provide that a listed company's code of business conduct and ethics should
include a policy regarding receipt of IPO shares by the company's directors and executive
officers.").
362 See id. at 4-5 (reflecting belief of the committee that open dialogue between the
underwriter and the issuer's board of directors during the pricing process would ensure that the
final pricing would not prejudice the issuer as a whole or its shareholders).
363 See id. at 11 (noting that the issuers should bear some of the burden to restore integrity to
the IPO process by ensuring that individuals at the company do not breach their duty of loyalty to
the shareholders of that company).
364 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Trading in Hot Equity Offerings,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,325, 71 S.E.C. Docket 1024 (Jan. 10, 2000) (first amendment);
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 2 to Proposed Rule Change
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Trading in Hot Equity
Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 43,627, S.E.C. Docket 2394 (Nov. 28, 2000) (second
amendment); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 3 and 4 to a
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Regarding
Restrictions on the Purchase and Sale of Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities, Exchange
Act Release No. 46,942, 67 Fed. Reg. 75,889 (Dec. 10, 2002) (third and fourth amendments);
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1
Through 4 Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of
Amendment No. 5 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to
Restrictions on the Purchases and Sales of Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities, Exchange
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being approved by the SEC on October 24, 2003.365 Rule 2790 replaces
the Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation that previously offered
guidance and prohibitions on IPO allocations to member broker-dealers.
Among other things, Rule 2790 eliminates any distinction between
initial public offerings generally and "hot" issues, 366 thereby creating a
much larger category of persons who are prohibited from receiving IPO
allocations.3 6 7 Specifically, the category of "conditionally restricted"
persons that were restricted recipients only in "hot" offerings under
certain circumstances are now restricted recipients in all offerings under
all circumstances. 368 However, large institutional investors, such as
large insurance companies and retirement funds, are exempt from this
prohibition.3 6 9 In addition, the text of Rule 2790 specifically allows
underwriters to sell IPO shares at the public offering price "as part of an
accommodation to a non-restricted person customer of the
broker/dealer., 370 Therefore, underwriters can continue to allocate IPO
shares on a discretionary basis to regular customers. Rule 2790 also left
largely intact the ability of issuers to direct 37IPO shares to specific
persons 371 through friends and family programs. 2
Act Release No. 48,701, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,126 (Oct. 31, 2003) (fifth amendment and final
approval) [hereinafter Rule 2790 Approval Order]; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Interpret Two Provisions of New NASD Rule 2790
Relating to Initial Public Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 48,973, 2003 WL 23004952 (Dec.
22, 2003) (interpreting a hedge fund exemption and clarifying application to a sale in a fund-offunds context).
365 See Rule 2790 Approval Order, supra note 364. Because of the significant changes in this
new rule, the NASD allowed for a three-month transitional period during which members could
comply with either Rule 2790 or the Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation. Beginning
March 24, 2004, all members must conform practices to Rule 2790. See NTM 03-79, supra note
289, at 1.
366 A "hot" issue was interpreted to mean "securities of a public offering which trade at a
premium in the secondary market whenever such secondary market begins." See Free-Riding and
Withholding Interpretation, supra note 106, at (b).
367 See NTM 03-79, supra note 289, at 840 (noting as one reason for the elimination of the
distinction between hot issues and other issues is the difficulty in predicting whether the issue
will trade at a premium and, subsequently, what categories of persons could be allocated IPO
shares).
368 Under the Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation, certain classes of buyers would be
"restricted" if the IPO shares traded at a premium. Those shares would be cancelled and returned,
but only if the recipient could not demonstrate that the shares were bought as a "normal
investment practice" and represented an insubstantial amount compared to the IPO shares bought
by the public. See Free-Riding and Withholding Interpretation, supra note 106, at (b)(5). Under
new Rule 2790, these buyers would be unconditionally restricted from buying IPO shares under
any circumstances. See NASD Rule 2790(a)(1); NTM 03-79, supra note 289, at 840 (explaining
that Rule 2790 has a smaller set of restricted persons than the Free-Riding and Withholding
Interpretation, but has no exceptions based on "normal investment practice").
369 See NASD Rule 2790(c)(3)(A) (insurance company accounts with 1,000 or more
policyholders); NASD Rule 2790(c)(1) (investment companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940); NASD Rule 2790(c)(7) (qualified ERISA benefits plans).
370 See id. 2790(a)(4)(B).
371 See id. 2790(d) (allowing issuers to direct IPO shares to otherwise restricted persons). But
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Proposed Rule 2712

If approved, proposed NASD Rule 2712 will go further than Rule
2790 to reform IPO allocation practices. First proposed in August
2002, 17 proposed Rule 2712, entitled "Proposed Rule Governing
Allocations and Distributions of Shares in Initial Public Offerings," was
amended in September 2003374 and supplemented in November 2003311
to incorporate some of the recommendations of the IPO Advisory
Committee.
The current text of proposed Rule 2712 would prohibit
underwriters from allocating IPO shares to customers in consideration
for either excessive compensation or future or current investment
banking business. 3 76 In addition, underwriters may not selectively
impose a penalty bid for flipping.3 77 An earlier version of the rule
would have prohibited underwriters from requesting that persons
receiving allocations buy additional shares in the aftermarket, but this
section was deleted. 3 78 The latest round of amendments address the
underwriting agreement and require that its terms require the
underwriter to periodically update a pricing committee or the entire
Board of Directors of the issuer of indications of interest and pricing

see NTM 03-79, supra note 289, at 846-47 (warning members that issuer-directed shares must
indeed be directed by the issuer and that underwriters should not ask issuers to direct securities to
restricted persons for the benefit of the underwriter).
372 But see Wright, supra note 176 ("Best of all, these programs should be banned altogether.
Allocations in an IPO should be made purely in the long-term interests of the company and its
shareholders-not in the interests of its bankers, its business associates or the managing director's
dad and someone with whom he once shared a rather nice lunch.").
373 See National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 02-55 (Aug. 2002)
(requesting comment on Proposed New Rule 2712 (IPO Allocations and Distributions)
[hereinafter NTM 02-55].
374 See National Association of Securities Dealers, Proposed Rule Change on Form 19b-4, File
No. SR-NASD-2003-140 (Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Sept. 2003 Proposed Amendments].
375 See NTM 03-72, supra note 334 (proposing in new subsection (e) several
recommendations of the IPO Advisory Committee, including enhanced disclosure of indications
of interest to the issuer by the underwriter, uniform lock-up periods for officers and directors and
recipients of issuer-directed shares, public announcement prior to the waiver of any restriction on
any IPO shares, sales of returned shares on an exchange at the current price and not the IPO price,
and prohibitions on accepting market orders for IPO shares on the first day of trading).
376 See NTM 02-55, supra note 373, at Exhibit A (Rule 2712(a), (c)).
377 See id. (Rule 2712(d)).
378 See Sept. 2003 Proposed Amendments, supra note 374, at 11-12 (noting that the first
version of proposed Rule 2712 received comments from members such as the Securities Industry
Association that a rule prohibiting underwriters from encouraging customers to buy shares in the
aftermarket would be "difficult to supervise or monitor"). The outcry against this provision and
subsequent withdrawal should not be surprising, given that the SEC proposed in 1974 to
eliminate tie-in arrangements by enacting new Rule 1Ob-20; however, this proposal was
withdrawn fourteen years later. See Withdrawal of Proposed Rules Under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26182, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (October 14,
1988) [hereinafter SEC Release 26182].
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information in the pre-effective period. 379 In addition, any lock-up
agreement in the underwriting agreement would also apply to any
issuer-directed shares, 380 and any waiver of any lock-up agreement may
only take place two days following a public announcement of that
waiver. 381
In the Notice to Members publishing the November 2003
amendments, the NASD also asked members to comment on alternative
regulatory approaches "to promote transparency in IPO pricing." 382 The
three approaches suggested were: (1) requiring underwriters to deliver
an opinion of an independent broker-dealer that both the initial IPO
price range and the final IPO price were reasonable; (2) requiring
underwriters to use a system such as an auction to accumulate
indications of interest from investors; and (3) requiring the final
prospectus to include a "valuation disclosure" section with financial
data that supports the final IPO price.383
4.

Potential Effect on IPO Practice

Although both Rule 2790 and Proposed Rule 2712, if approved,
would improve the IPO process, the improvements would merely
address the symptoms that are caused by a system rife with agency
problems. The bookbuilding system, even as reformed, 384 is the
inherent cause of these symptoms and provides incentives for
underpricing, allocating underpriced IPO shares in return for excessive
compensation or investment banking business, and distributing
underpriced IPO shares to key executives in return for business for the
issuer. The only long-term solution to this problem is to abolish the
bookbuilding system wholesale. Without the ability to lock-in profits
for certain recipients, underwriters would then have no incentive to
manipulate the price in the aftermarket through laddering agreements,
flipping restrictions, lock-up agreements, and stabilization activities. If
IPO shares were distributed through a more transparent process, with all
of the shares in the IPO being allocated anonymously at an auction
price, then the unfair practices would disappear. The issuer would
379 NTM 03-72, supra note 334, at 778 (Rule 2712(e)(l)(A)).
380 See id.(Rule 2712(e)(l)(B)).
381 See id.(Rule 2712(e)(1)(C)).
382 See id. at 772, 776.
383 See id.

384 In fact, reporters have already found large loopholes in the new Rule 2790, including the
ability of an underwriter to siphon underpriced IPO shares to hedge funds in which the
investment bank, employees of the bank, or relatives of the bank's employees have a beneficial
interest of up to ten percent. See Gregory Zuckerman, NASD Opens Door to Profitfor Brokers
on 1POs: Agency Tightens Some Rules, Eases Prohibition Meant to Limit Conflicts of Interest,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2004, at Al.
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receive the maximum amount the market will bear for its equity shares.
The underwriter would no longer be able to use the representation of the
issuer to attract wealth from brokerage customers or investment banking
customers. The underwriter would not be able to benefit either directly
or indirectly from underpricing the issuer's shares and will only benefit
by representing the issuer well and increasing its reputation as a
competent underwriter. If an alternative method of distributing shares
were used, such as a true Dutch auction, then the underwriter would be
able to focus on achieving the best result for the issuer, not for the
individual underwriter or the investment bank.
In addition, if shares were priced and allocated according to a blind
auction process, the agency problems between the- founders and the
issuer would be minimized. The founders would also have no conflict
of interest with the issuer during the offering and would not have the
ability to use friends and family shares to unjustly enrich cronies or as
bribes for potential business partners. Furthermore, if the distribution of
shares via public auction produced an offering price more reflective of
the actual market price, then the underwriter would not have to engage
in manipulative aftermarket activities to ensure that the original buyers
can sell at a higher price. The underwriter would not be concerned with
whether any of the investors would flip their shares because the market
price should be relatively stable in the first days of the offering, unlike
in a bookbuilding offering. Underwriters would have no special
interests pressuring them to sustain a price for a certain period, so
flipping restrictions and lock-ups would not need to be used for this
purpose.
At a minimum, more stringent reforms are necessary to restrain the
moral hazard created by the bookbuilding method. Specifically, the
underwriter should not be allowed to allocate a large percentage of the
original issue. If we presume that the underwriter must be allowed
some allocations to effectively conduct a bookbuilding offering, the
amount of discretionary allocations should be small, perhaps 25 percent
or less. Other proposals being considered under Rule 2712 would help
the underwriter determine a price other than relying on price
information from potential buyers. In addition, friends and family
programs should be restricted as well. The IPO Advisory Committee
suggested that these programs be restricted to 5 percent of the offering;
combined with the underwriter's 25 percent discretionary allocation,
this plan would leave 70 percent for the public float. This loosening of
the supply could also relieve demand pressure, creating a less frenzied
environment for first-day returns. I would also argue that the
underwriter should not be able to impose any flipping restrictions on the
original IPO shares that are allocated.
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Analyst Reports

Although analysts were only one piece of the larger IPO puzzle,
analyst conflicts seemed to present a discrete and solvable problem that
attracted regulators. In response to media attention on analyst conflicts
of interest, the SEC, the NASD, the NYSE, and the federal legislature
proposed new reforms designed to make analysts more independent or
at least inform the investing public 385 about possible connections
between the analyst and either the covered company or the investment
banking firm that employs the analyst.
Regulation AC

1.

On February 27, 2003, the SEC approved Regulation AC,38 6 which
requires research analysts to include in each research report a
certification that attests to the independence of the report. Among other
things, the certification must include statements that the views in the
report accurately reflect the analyst's personal views about the issuer
and that the analyst did not and will not receive compensation that is
directly or indirectly tied to the recommendations or views expressed in
the report.38 7 In the alternative, if the analyst cannot affirm that his
compensation is not derived from the views expressed in the report, the
analyst must include a statement detailing the particulars of the
compensation and "disclosing that the compensation could influence the
report." 388 These
recommendations or views expressed in the research
389
requirements also apply to public appearances.
2.

Rule 2711

In May 2002, the SEC approved a new NASD rule, Rule 2711,
regarding conflicts between research analysts and the investment banks
that employ them. 390 This rule is much more detailed and far-reaching
than Regulation AC. Although Rule 2711 was passed relatively

385 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1068 (observing the SEC's first reaction was to merely
post a brochure, "Analyzing Analyst Recommendations," on its website to inform investors of the
types of potential conflicts of interest that an analyst may have).
386 Regulation Analyst Certification, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482-01 (Feb. 27, 2003) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R., pt. 242).
387 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(1), (2)(i) (2003).
388 Id. § 242.501(2)(ii).
389 Id. § 242.502.
390 See Rule 2711 Approval Order, supra note 257.
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quickly,39 ' the rule then was amended several times to incorporate new

requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.392 The
current text of Rule 2711 generally addresses the relationship between

an investment banking firm and its research department, compensation
of analysts, analysts' personal trading practices, the circumstances
surrounding and the timing of research reports, and additional

disclosures in connection with research reports.
Much of the new rule addresses the conflicts that arise between the
analyst and the investment banking client. Although the NASD
maintains that promising favorable research reports to entice investment
banking business was already prohibited under Rule 2110 as a violation
of just and equitable principles of trade, Rule 2711(e) explicitly
prohibits such practices. 393 To further ensure that an analyst's report is
unencumbered by issuer expectations, analysts are also prohibited from

submitting a research report to an issuer prior to its release except for
the sole purpose of verifying factual information in specific sections and
then only under the supervision of legal or compliance personnel.3 94 In

addition, analysts are prohibited from engaging in "efforts to solicit
investment banking business.

39 5

To relieve the pressure of analysts to

391 The proposed rule change was filed on March 8, 2002, and approved on May 10, 2002.
See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of filing of Proposed Rule Changes by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45526, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,526
(Mar. 8, 2002); Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Extension of the Comment Period for
the Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-45679, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,526 (Apr. 4, 2002).
392 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344 ("Supervisory Analysts"), 345A
("Continuing Education for Registered Persons"), 351 ("Reporting Requirements") and 472
("Communications with the Public") and by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act.
Release No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875-01 (S.E.C. Release No.) (Aug. 4, 2003).
Section 501 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires the SEC to adopt rules to separate
analysts from investment banking departments and to increase disclosure of conflicts of interest.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (Supp. 2003); see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 52, at 1076-77
(describing the details of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that pertain to analyst conflicts).
393 See Rule 2711(e) ("No member may directly or indirectly offer favorable research, a
specific rating or a specific price target, or threaten to change research, a rating or a price target,
to a company as consideration or inducement for the receipt of business or compensation.").
394 See Rule 2711(c).
395 Earlier amendments of the rule contained the language:
No research analyst may issue a research report or make a public appearance
concerning a subject company if the research analyst engaged in any communication
with the subject company in furtherance of obtaining investment banking business
prior to the time the subject company entered into a letter of intent or other written
agreement with the member designating the member as an underwriter of an initial
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issue positive research reports at specific times during the IPO process
to increase demand, Rule 2711 prohibits issuing reports for forty days
after the date of an IPO 396 and during the fifteen days before and after
3 97
"the expiration, waiver or termination of a lock-up agreement" if the
analyst's firm acted as the manager or co-manager of the IPO.
The new rule also attempts to decrease the institutional conflicts
between the analyst and the investment banking firm. Rule 2711 (b)
outlines procedures that the firm must take to ensure that analysts are
not subject to the "supervision or control" of the investment banking
department, including "influence or control over the compensatory
evaluation" of the analyst.398 In addition, no analyst compensation may
be based on any relationship between the analyst's research reports and
investment banking clients. 399 Communications between analysts and
the investment banking department concerning research reports must be
supervised by legal or compliance personnel. °0
Although analysts and their firms may own securities in the
companies that are subject to analysts' reports, Rule 2711 imposes some
restrictions and disclosure obligations on those investments.
Specifically, analysts cannot receive pre-IPO stock if the company is
engaged in the same "types of business as companies that the research
analyst follows."' 40 1 In addition, the analyst cannot buy or sell shares (or
derivatives of such shares) for the thirty days before and the five days
after the publication of any report concerning that company except
under specific circumstances.40 2 On research reports and in public
appearances, the analyst must disclose if he or any member of his
public offering by the subject company.
See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 2 to Proposed Rule
Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344 ("Supervisory
Analysts"), 345A ("Continuing Education for Registered Persons"), 351 ("Reporting
Requirements"), and 472 ("Communications With the Public") and by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to NASD Rule 2711 ("Research Analysts and Research
Reports"), Exchange Act Release No. 34-47912, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,148-01 (S.E.C. Release No.)
(May 29, 2003) (noting that in response to commenters' objections that "in furtherance of
obtaining investment banking business" was too vague, the NASD changed the language).
396 See Rule 271 l(f)(1)(A). If the analyst's firm was an underwriter or dealer in the IPO, then
the analyst may not issue a report or make a public appearance for twenty-five calendar days
regarding the issuer. See Rule 2711 (f)(2).
397 See Rule 271 l(f)(4).
398 See Rule 2711 (b).
399 See Rule 271 1(b) (2) (giving as suitable factors in deciding analyst compensation: (1) the
productivity and quality of research; (2) actual relationship between analysts' recommendations
and actual stock price performance; and (3) ratings by either independent ratings services or noninvestment banking peers and clients).
400 See Rule 271 l(b)(3).
401 See Rule 2711(g)(1).
402 See Rule 271 l(g)(2) (noting that an analyst could purchase or sell a security if legal or
compliance personnel approved the change and the purchase or sale was due to either significant
events impacting the company or a significant change in the analyst's personal financial
circumstances).
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family has a financial interest in the securities of the subject company 4°3
or if the firm owns 1 percent or more of any class of common stock of
the subject company.4 °4
Finally, research reports must also contain disclosures regarding
both whether the analyst has received any compensation based on
investment banking revenues from the subject company in the past year
and the extent to which the firm has served as an investment banking
service provider for the subject company in the past year or expects to
do so in the next three months.4 °5
3.

Potential Effect on IPO Practice

In contrast to the limited reforms reflected in Rule 2790, and even
proposed Rule 2712, Rule 2711 is fairly far-reaching in its restrictions
on research analysts and the firms that employ them. Although the
NASD surely could have required analysts not to own shares in the
companies that they cover, that restriction may have been seen as too
stringent. In addition, requiring disclosure of the fact that an investment
firm owned 1 percent or more of a public company seems a pretty high
threshold, given that an investment firm could have a multi-million
dollar position in a large company without triggering disclosure
requirements.
Perhaps the financial services community was willing to allow
regulation of research analysts, but not so willing to completely
overhaul lucrative IPO underwriting practices, given the speed with
which Rule 2711 was passed as compared to lengthy approval processes
for Rules 2790 and 2712. The industry may have realized that increased
analyst regulation was inevitable given the aggressive SEC
investigation that culminated in the Global Settlement of Analyst
Conflict of Interest. Whether industry acquiescence to Rule 2711
reflects the use of research analysts as sacrificial lambs by investment
banks or merely reveals the investment banks choosing wisely among
different battles, Rule 2711 should have a large and positive impact on
the independence of research reports.

403 See Rule 271 l(h)(A) (including as a "financial interest" options, rights, warrants, futures,
and long and short positions).
404 See Rule 271 l(h)(1)(B) (calculating a firm's interest as of the end of the month before the
publication of the report or the public appearance).
405 See Rule 271 l(h)(2).
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VIII.
A.

REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE LITIGATION

Global Settlement ofAnalyst Conflict of Interest

In one of the most publicized legal actions arising out of the

40 6
bursting of the technology bubble, the SEC named in a lawsuit ten
40 7 and two prominent investment
major New York investment banks
analysts, Jack Grubman and Henry Bledget. Although allegations of
improper IPO allocation practices were included both in the lawsuit and
40 8
in the settlement against two of the defendants, this lawsuit focused

mainly on the conflicts of interest that arose between investment

analysts, who were issuing research reports on issuer's stocks with buy
and sell recommendations, and the investment banking firms that
employed them. The lawsuits alleged that the investment banks were

routinely authorizing and possibly requiring analysts such as Grubman

and Blodget to give favorable ratings to clients when those ratings were
not warranted. 40 9 This practice was so pervasive that during 2000,

analysts were giving "buy" recommendations for issuers whose
410 All of the defendants
businesses were plummeting into bankruptcy.
entered into the Global Settlement of Analyst Conflict of Interest on

April 28, 2003, pursuant to which each defendant signed a Letter of
Acceptance, Waiver and Consent under NASD rules without admitting
or denying the allegations or findings. Under the Global Settlement,
which was negotiated by the SEC, the New York Attorney General's
office, and NASD and NYSE officials, the defendants agreed to pay
$1.4 billion dollars, with $387.5 million of that sum to go to a fund to
11 Grubman and Blodget were both
reimburse aggrieved investors. 4
barred from the securities industry by the SEC, NASD, and NYSE and
412
ordered to pay fines of $15 million and $4 million, respectively.

406 See SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., et al., 03 Civ. 2937 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
407 The firms included Bear, Steams & Co., J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., Lehman Brothers
Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc., UBS
Warburg LLC, Goldman, Sachs & Co., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., f/k/a/ Salomon Smith
Barney, and Credit Suisse First Boston LLC. See id.
408 In the complaint, CSFB and Salomon were charged with spinning IPO shares in "hot" IPO
offerings in violation of NASD Rule 2110. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 76, at 5.
409 See Citigroup Consent Letter, supra note 262, at 5; CSFB Consent Letter, supra note 147,
at 4.
410 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 52.
411 See Press Release, NASD, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28,
2003), availableat http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_018.html.
412 See Press Release, NASD, The SEC, New York Attorney General's Office, NASD and
New York Stock Exchange permanently bar Jack Grubman and Require $15 Million Payment
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release03 016.html); Press
Release, NASD, The SEC, New York Attorney General's Office, NASD and New York Stock
Exchange permanently bar Henry Blodget and Require $4 Million Payment (Apr. 28, 2003),
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The settlement also requires the firms to take positive steps to
insulate the research departments of their firms from the investment
banking activities.41 3 Analyst compensation must not be connected in
any way to investment banking business, and investment banking
personnel may not supervise or evaluate analysts. In addition, analysts
no longer can have a role in recruiting investment banking clients or in
touting offerings in road shows. Although analysts and investment
banks are not prohibited from owning shares in the companies that the
analysts cover, analysts must disclose the possibility of any conflict in
research reports.41 4 The settlement also funds independent research for
five years. During this period, the firms must purchase independent,
third-party research from at least three independent research firms and
make this research available to its customers. 1 5
Because of the timing of the Global Settlement, the structural
reforms included in the settlement incorporate the requirements of
Regulation AC and NASD Rule 2711 and anticipate the July 2003
amendments to Rule 2711. Accordingly, the structural reforms of the
Global Settlement currently do no more than require investment
banking firms to comply with existing SEC and NASD rules. However,
in one highly publicized snafu, at least one firm is finding compliance
with the settlement problematic.4 1 6 In addition, some commentators
have noted that U.S. firms have not changed their practices in the
European market to conform to the settlement.41 7
B.

Voluntary Initiative RegardingIPO Allocations

In April 2003, the ten investment banks that were parties to the
Global Settlement also entered into a Voluntary Initiative Regarding
Allocations of Securities in "Hot" Initial Public Offerings to Corporate
Executives and Directors.418 This initiative states that it will be
availableat http://www.nasdr.corn/news.pr2003/release03017.html.
413 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 76, at 8 (outlining structural reforms).
414 See id. at 8-9. However, firms will only have to state that the firm "does and seeks to do
business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware
that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report." Id.
415 See id. at 9.
416 See Ann Davis, Bear Stearns Used Analyst to Tout IPO Despite Pact with Regulators,
WALL ST. J., May 12, 2003, at Al (reporting that Bear Steams allowed an analyst to appear in an
electronic roadshow for the IPO of iPayment just days after entering into the Global Settlement).
417 See Silvia Ascarelli, Europe's IPO: Analysts' Game is the Same, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2003, at Cl (noting that weeks after the Global Settlement, Goldman Sachs, CSFB, and J.P.
Morgan took analysts to pitch investment banking services to a potential European IPO client,
Bank Austria Creditanstalt); Erik Portanger, Banned in U.S., but Alright Overseas?,WALL ST. J.,
June 6, 2003, at CI (reporting that days after the Global Settlement, Citigroup and UBS Warburg
used analysts to woo potential IPO client Tussaud's Group in London).
418 See Voluntary Initiative Regarding Allocations of Securities in "Hot" Public Offerings to
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effective until the earlier of a date five years from its execution or the
effective date of any new rule "that would place restrictions on the
ability of investment banking firms to allocate securities in 'hot' IPOs to
executive officers and directors of public companies." 4 19 Presumably,
this initiative has been superseded by the SEC's approval of NASD
Rule 2790.
Under the initiative the investment banking firms agreed not to
allocate securities in a "hot" IPO to any executive officer or director of
a publicly traded U.S. company, not to allocate securities in any IPO for
the purpose of rewarding or enticing investment banking business, and
not to allow investment banking personnel other than the firm's equity
capital markets group to make IPO allocations. 420 Although the
initiative would still allow IPO allocations to institutional investors and
to regular customers, its terms are stricter than the final provisions of
Even proposed Rule 2712, which would prohibit
Rule 2790.
underwriters from allocating IPO shares to customers in consideration
for future or current investment banking business, does not extend to
prohibiting any allocations to officers and directors of publicly traded
companies.42 1
C.

Civil Lawsuits Involving IPO Allocations

Private investors have filed thousands of lawsuits in federal court
against investment banks and issuers that accuse the two groups of
manipulating the market and inflating stock prices by, among other
things, allocating IPO shares to customers in return for promises to buy
more shares of the stock in the aftermarket at pre-arranged prices.
Many of these lawsuits were consolidated into two class actions, In re
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 422 which alleged that
through a complex scheme of laddering agreements, undisclosed
compensation, and biased analyst reports, the investment banks and the
issuers violated federal securities laws by artificially increasing the
price of IPO stock to the detriment of the retail investor, and In re Initial

Corporate Executives and Directors, at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/globalvolinit.htm (last
visited Apr. 28, 2003).
419 Id.

420 See id.at (1), (3), (4).
421 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
422 In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (transferring
1,100 actions to ongoing case in Southern District of New York involving over 1,000 actions
alleging that issuer and underwriter defendants manipulated the IPO process by tie-in
arrangements, misleading analyst reports, and nondisclosures of excess commissions). The first
of these claims was appropriately filed near the beginning of the new millennium. Makaron v.
VA Linux Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 242 (filed Jan. 11, 2001).
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Public Offering Antitrust Litigation,4 2 3 which alleged that these same
practices violated federal antitrust laws. The second case was dismissed
on the theory that the federal securities laws effectively repeal federal
antitrust laws under the doctrine of implied immunity.42 4
The Master Allegations document in In re IPO Securities
Litigation depicts a vast conspiracy of investment banks and issuers
joining together to artificially raise IPO shares prices in 309 issues long
enough to extract profits from retail investors.42 5 The claims allege
violations of § 11, 15, 10(b), and 20 of the 1934 Act. In addition, the
plaintiffs claim that the investment banks engaged in market
manipulation in violation of § 10(b), controlling and artificially
affecting the price of a security. The plaintiffs in In re IPO Securities
Litigation argue that the issuers had motivation to see the stock price
increase, and therefore the necessary fraudulent intent, because with that
high stock price issuers could then engage in other activities to raise
capital, including secondary offerings and mergers and acquisitions.426
Plaintiffs also argued that individuals at an issuing corporation, who
necessarily make decisions for the corporation, also stood to gain from
increasing continued demand for the stock because they then could sell
individual stock holdings or exercise stock options and reap enormous
427
gains.
After the plaintiffs in IPO Securities Litigation survived a Motion
to Dismiss in February 2003,428 the 300 issuer defendants, but not the
underwriter defendants, entered into a $1 billion settlement. 429 Under
the terms of the settlement, if the plaintiffs eventually recover more than
$1 billion from the remaining investment bank defendants, then the
issuers will pay nothing to the plaintiffs. In addition, the issuers
assigned the rights to any causes of action that they might have against
423 In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., No. 01-2014 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (alleging that the
syndicate bookbuilding system violated the Sherman Act and that agreements between
underwriters and customers not to flip IPO shares violated the Robinson-Patman Act).
424 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing actions under both the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act due to the pervasive
regulation of alleged activities by the SEC).
425 In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
426 Id. at 368-69.

427 Id. at 366 (alleging individual profits ranging from $220,000 to $40 million).
428 Note that Judge Shira Scheindlin did grant the motion to dismiss as it related to issuer
defendants who did not engage in later capital-raising transactions such as secondary offerings or
mergers and acquisitions. The Judge reasoned that in those cases, under the PSLRA, the
plaintiffs did not adequately plead facts that tended to show intent on the parts of those issuers.
In addition, Judge Scheindlin dismissed some claims under Section I I brought by plaintiffs who
sold stock above the offering price but who nevertheless felt they were defrauded by the IPO
allocation scheme. Regarding this issue of first impression, the Judge held that these plaintiffs
had no damages as a matter of law. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
429 Internet Boom Companies Agree to Pay $1

Billion to Settle IPO Dispute, 10 No. 6

ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 23 (July 2003) (calling the settlement the "largest recovery
attributable to Wall Street's unethical condition between January 1998 and December 2000").
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the investment banks to the plaintiffs. 430 The remaining underwriting
defendants renewed motions to dismiss following a ruling by the
Second Circuit that "loss causation" could be sustained by a showing of
"market manipulation" in certain circumstances.43 ' In December 2003,
the District Court once again denied the Motion to Dismiss, reiterating
that loss causation incurred in the sale of a security may be adequately
pled by merely alleging facts that, if true, prove that the underwriters
manipulated the market. 4 32 In October 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled on
plaintiffs' motion to certify certain classes of plaintiff, certifying
Exchange Act claims for six focus cases.433

IX. RE-INVENTING THE WHEEL OF FORTUNE
With economic recovery upon us4 3 4 and a resurgence occurring in
the IPO market, 435 now is the time to overhaul the IPO process. Current
indications suggest the end of the 1999-2000 Boom was not the end of
the retail investor and growth in this segment of the investor population
will continue.43 6 Although the SEC and the NASD approved broad430 Id.
431 Emergent

Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Emergent court explains that although plaintiffs must prove that the price drop that created
their losses was caused by defendant's actions, not just the artificial price inflation, because
plaintiffs allege a market manipulation in a "pump and dump" scheme, loss causation is
adequately pled. Id. at 197. In a securities fraud case based solely on material misstatements,
plaintiffs must prove that the eventual price decline was caused by a correction of the
misstatement or other defendant action. Id. at 198.
432 In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reasoning that
plaintiffs' claims adequately pled loss causation because a market manipulation claim does not
require pleading of separate defendant action that causes price to eventually drop because "[i]n
market manipulation cases . . . it may be permissible to infer that the artificial inflation will
inevitably dissipate.").
433 See In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2297401 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004)
(analyzing cases against six representative issuers: Corris Corp., Engage Technologies, Inc.,
Firepond, Inc., IXL Enterprises, Inc., Sycamore Networks, Inc., and VA Linux Corp.).
434 See E.S. Browning, Another Saga of the Running of the Bulls, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at

R1 (noting the Dow Jones Industrial Average finished 2003 up 43.5 percent from its low on
October 9, 2002 and the NASDAQ Composite Index was up 80 percent from its low on the same
day).
435 See Ben Elgin, Robert D. Hof & Emily Thornton, Initial Public Momentum, BUS. WEEK,

Nov. 17, 2003, at 48 (predicting that 150-200 companies will go public in 2004); Hennessey,
Revived, supra note 299, at C5 (reporting the IPO share prices of China Life Insurance Co. and
Universal Technology Institute, Inc. gained 27 percent and 29 percent, respectively, on their first
days of trading, although Orbitz Inc. ended its first day of trading down almost $I).
436 See John Hechinger & Jeff D. Opdyke, Day Trading Makes a Comeback and Brokers Vie

for the Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that online brokerages saw "active
trading" increase by 15-30 percent in September 2003); see also Browning, supra note 434, at RI
(quoting an investment strategist as saying: "Investors did not learn a lesson over 2000-2002. We
continue to see an unhealthy addiction to technology stocks, as well as a revival of the margin
debt problem.").
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based reforms aimed at making research analysts more independent,
that issue was merely part of a much larger problem. However,
dismantling the IPO profit machine will not be easy,437 and the financial
industry will not be willing participants in the reforms that would be
required to create a truly transparent, democratic IPO offering
process. 4 38 Perhaps just as tax professionals have an investment in the
current Internal Revenue Code,4 39 the industry players are too invested
IPO rulemaking to
in the "crazy quilt" of existing SEC and NASD
440
welcome a complete overhaul of the process.
A.

Eliminate the BookbuildingMethod

As discussed, the bookbuilding method, with its concomitant
characteristic of allowing the underwriter unfettered discretion in
allocation of IPO shares, creates a system open to underpricing and
allocation abuses. If the bookbuilding approach is eliminated, all of the
abuses of that system will be eliminated as well. The underwriter would
have no ability to underprice and no ability to handpick beneficiaries of
built-in profit. Without the incentive to sustain artificially high share
prices to benefit privileged recipients, the underwriter will have no
incentive to collude with investors in laddering agreements, antiflipping agreements or lock-in agreements. 441 The underwriter will also
have no need to collude with research analysts to maintain artificial
prices for the benefit of share recipients and insiders." 2 Agency costs

437 Earlier efforts to reform underwriting practices in the IPO process have failed miserably.
See SEC Release 26182, supra note 378 (withdrawing after fourteen years proposed SEC Rule
1Ob-20 that sought to explicitly prohibit laddering and tie-in agreements that "may artificially
stimulate higher public demand for such shares" and "unjustly [deprive] many members of the
public the opportunity to purchase such hot issue shares at their original offering prices"); see
also Certain Manipulative Practices in Public Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 74-11328, 40
Fed. Reg. 16,090 (April 2, 1974).
438 See Lane, supra note 6, at *2 (noting that his ambitious IPO reforms in SEC Release
7606A (dubbed the "aircraft carrier") garnered 190 comments and that the most vigorous
opponents were "the securities industry" and "corporate lawyers").
439 See Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusion of Tax Simplification, 2
GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 320, 347-48 (1994) (conceptualizing the U.S. tax code as rules
of a game in which the players invest substantial time and effort in learning how best to maximize
outcomes under these rules and therefore may be "reluctant to acknowledge that there is even a
'problem').
440 See Lane, supra note 6, at *2 (reporting unhappily that his efforts to substantially overhaul
aspects of securities regulation were not met with industry enthusiasm for a "new strategic
model").
441 See Corbus, supra note 295 (noting that generally in an IPO auction, no "pops" occur and
no flipping occurs).
442 Elimination of the bookbuilding method would not eliminate conflicts between analysts
and their investment banking employers in connection with pleasing current issuer clients or
attracting potential issuer clients. However, Rule 2711 does provide a framework for eliminating
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arising out of the relationship between the issuer and the underwriter
will be substantially reduced, as will agency costs inherent in the
relationship between the founders and the underwriters, merely by
eliminating the ability of these two groups to underprice IPO shares to
reap the benefits of built-in profits.
To accomplish this goal, a new paradigm for the issuer-underwriter
relationship must be created. The U.S. underwriting market is clearly
entrenched in using the bookbuilding method. Even the IPO Advisory
Committee members stated their preference that "[t]he market, and not
regulators, should determine whether bookbuilding, a Dutch auction or
another method is desirable for a particular IPO." However, the
NASD's NTM 03-72 issued this year does ask for comments on
"requiring underwriters to ... use an auction or other system to collect
indications of interest to help establish the final IPO price."" 3 If the
NASD does not restrict the use of the bookbuilding method, then
powerful issuers such as Google can help force the market for
underwriting IPOs adapt to a more issuer-friendly system. Online
auctions may continue to draw clientele in the next hot market if
founders of start-up companies can be persuaded that auctions promise
the cheapest method of obtaining the most capital for the issuer.
Unfortunately, without regulatory intervention or substantial price
competition from online IPO auction firms, bookbuilding will probably
be the dominant method of distributing IPOs for the foreseeable
future. 4 "

B.

Restrict the Ability of the Underwriterto Make Discretionary
Allocations

Within the framework of the bookbuilding distribution system, the
NASD should go further to create a more democratic distribution
process. The easiest way to do this is to decrease the underwriter's
discretion in allocating an offering. As proposed in Section V.A., the
underwriter's ability to pre-allocate original IPO shares should be
limited to twenty-five percent of the offering or less, and any friends
and family program should be limited to five percent or less, in keeping
with recommendations of the IPO Advisory Committee. As the number
of shares available for underwriter allocation diminishes, the incentive

those conflicts.
443 NTM 03-72, supra note 334, at 772.
444 See Gardner & Gardner, supra note 66 (interviewing Patrick Byme, CEO of
Overstock.com, who responded to underwriters who threatened not to give his IPO any coverage
if he chose to go with Hambrecht's OpenIPO system with the statement, "I don't negotiate with
terrorists.").
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to underprice also decreases and the ability to manipulate supply in the
aftermarket to maintain an artificial price becomes severely limited.
Much of the ability of the underwriter to manipulate aftermarket prices
stems from the small number of shares in the public float. Demand is
created for the full offering as reported in the registration statement, but
then buyers are unknowingly competing on price for as little as ten
percent of that volume. Potential investors who have entered "market"
orders with retail brokerage firms may be buying shares at a much
higher price. As the public float begins to approach the actual size of
the public offering, the actions of market participants making free
choices to buy and sell will be able to determine the share price. For the
same reasons, I would propose prohibiting flipping restrictions and
lock-up agreements imposed by the underwriter. If the issuer wants to
restrict shares owned by insiders for other purposes, then the regulation
would not affect internal issuer policy. In addition, restricting the size
of friends and family programs will reduce some opportunism of the
founders to underprice and extract wealth for themselves and their
associates.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the IPO process is broken, and it has been for a long
time. Like any type of machine with an inherent design defect, the
problems caused by this defect are more pronounced during times when
the machine is overburdened. Accordingly, during IPO boom periods,
the abuses that are endemic to the IPO process have severe effects.
Unfortunately, once the boom is over, attention usually moves away
from this problem to a more timely concern, just as I forget, during the
summer months, about the funny noise that the furnace makes.
However, another IPO boom is certain to appear, and retail investors
will again fall prey to the abuses inherent in the IPO process. To
prevent these abuses from recurring in yet another IPO boom, regulators
should consider either eliminating the bookbuilding process altogether
or at least reforming it substantially thereby eliminating the agency
problems that are created by the opportunism endemic in the
discretionary allocation system.

